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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we first investigate the problem of source location estima-
tion in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) based on quantized data in the presence of
false information attacks. Using a Gaussian mixture to model the possible attacks,
we develop a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) to locate the source with sen-
sor data corrupted by injected false information, and call the approach quantized
received signal strength with a Gaussian mixture model (Q-RSS-GM). The Cramer-
Rao lower bound (CRLB) for this estimation problem is also derived to evaluate the
estimation performance. It is shown that the proposed estimator is robust in various
cases with different attack probabilities and parameter mismatch, and it significantly
outperforms the approach that ignores the possible false information attacks.
Then, we investigate the case with the assumption that the fusion center does
not have the knowledge of the attack probability and the attack noise power, which
is a more realistic assumption for real life applications. We assume that the attack
probability and power are random variables which follow certain uniform distributions
and are independent and identically distributed among sensors. We derive the MLE
for the localization problem based on quantized received signal strength which is
corrupted by the false information injection. The CRLB for this estimation problem
is also derived to evaluate the estimation performance. It is shown that the proposed
new MLE is robust and provides excellent performance without knowing the attack
parameters, such as attack probability and attack power.
The linear state estimation problem subjected to a spoofing attack (False Infor-
mation Injection) is also considered in this dissertation. We investigate the problem
of the Bayesian estimation in linear systems in the presence of false information injec-
tion attack. The relationship between the attacker and the defender is modeled from
vi
a minimax perspective, in which the attacker tries to maximize the cost function.
On the other hand, the defender tries to optimize the detection threshold selection to
minimize the attack effects on the system. We address the problem for two situations.
First, we consider that the attacker will attack with a deterministic bias injection.
In this case, we derive the probabilities of detection and miss according to the non-
central Chi squared distribution. The probability of false alarm is derived based on
the Chi squared distribution. We investigate the minimax optimization problem for
the cost function numerically. It is shown that for the attacker increasing the attack
power will maximize the cost function in general. On the other hand, for the defender
it is shown that there are three different regions in which the defender can work to
design the defending strategy. The defender will be able to optimize the cost function
if it has the prior information about the attacker power.
Secondly, we consider that the attacker will attack with a random bias injection.
In this case, we calculate the probabilities of the detection and miss detection accord-
ing to a numerical integration method. The probability of false alarm is obtained
by using the Chi squared distribution. We also formulate the minmax optimization
problem between the attacker and the defender. In this case, the attacker will be
able to maximize its effect on the system by increasing the injected bias covarinace
matrix, whereas if the defender has the prior information of the attack power, he/she
will be able to select the optimum detection threshold to minimize the cost function.
We solve the minimax optimization problem numerically for both the cases with
deterministic and random biases. Numerical results show that if the defender has
prior knowledge of the attacker power, it can select the optimum detection threshold
that minimizes the worst possible cost function accordingly. On the other hand, if
the defender has no prior knowledge of the attacker’s power, then the best strategy
for the defender is to always reject the corrupted sensors’ measurements.
vii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Background
The main goal of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is to collect the sensors’
measurements from a certain target or natural phenomena and send them to the
fusion center (FC) which processes the data and makes the required decisions accord-
ingly. Such characteristics can be employed in vast applications [1, 2, 3, 4]. The other
important aspect that makes the WSNs applicable for a wide range of applications
is the development of the wireless communication networks and devices which cul-
minated with the Internet that gives the possibility of connecting multiple devices
spread in a very wide area (around the globe). We can employ the devices connected
to the Internet like mobile phones and PCs as sensor devices, which can be utilized
to gather and transmit the data over the Internet. Such applications are called the
internet of things (IoT) [5] .
Because of the breadth of the applications, in which WSNs can play a crucial
role, there is increased interest in studying the challenges of the WSNs. There are
two main challenges faced by sensors networks. The first challenge involves manufac-
turing of these critical devices and trying to equip them with the required parts that
ensure their ability to operate in the field for long periods of time without human
intervention. The second challenge involves assuring the reliability and the accuracy
of the collected sensor measurements which can be affected by either an adversary, or
natural noise interference, that might corrupt the data and mislead the fusion center
(FC). In this dissertation, we are mainly concerned with the data reliability perspec-
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tive and developing the appropriate estimators that have the capability to tolerate
the corrupted data.
The developments in communication networks and devices did not change the
basic structure of the WSN, which consists of a large number of devices (sensors)
spread in a wide area also known as region of interest (ROI). The basic structure of
the WSNs creates multiple threats to the security of the sensors’ measurements which
will affect the applications based on the received data. There are several limitations
for the sensors devices like limited energy, communication and data processing power,
making them susceptible to multiple kinds of attacks or natural noise interference,
that may corrupt the collected data and cause the fusion center make inaccurate
decisons about the monitored phenomena. Sensor data digitization and quantization
have been adopted as a solution for the limited resources. For example, we can
quantize the received signal strength at the sensors before its transmission. This is
also known as quantized recived signal strength (Q-RSS) approach, which is used in
many WSNs applications [6].
According to the previous illustration of the typical structure of the WSNs and
the security issues that arise from such structure, the security of WSNs has become
an important topic which has been studied recently [7, 8]. Several attacks that the
WSNs might be facing, like Byzantine, man in the middle (MIMA), and spoofing
attacks, have been studied and classified [3]. Intentional sensor destruction by an
adversary could be also considered as a spoofing attack.
The spoofing attack changes the measurements from the sensors and it takes place
either between the sensors and the source/phenomena (corrupt the data entering the
sensors) or between the sensor and the fusion center (corrupt the data sent from
the sensor to the fusion center). False information injection attacks are considered
as spoofing attacks [9]. The spoofing attack in the wireless sensor networks and
2
multiple sensors estimation systems has attracted increasing attention recently [3]
. The spoofing attack can occur on the Global Positioning System (GPS), radar
and sonar systems, localization system via WSNs [3, 10]. We will use these two
terminologies i.e. false information injection and spoofing attack interchangeably in
the dissertation. There are also Byzantine attacks which happen when the adversary
takes control of a portion of the sensors and changes their quantized measurements
[2, 11, 12].
The problem of general parameter estimation in the presence of Byzantine or
spoofing attacks has been investigated in [1, 2, 12, 13, 14, 3]. In [1], Byzantine at-
tacks on sensor networks estimating unknown parameters based on binary data have
been studied. Two attack strategies depending on the amount of information avail-
able to the adversary, namely full information and information free attacks, have
been investigated. Full information attacks proved to be more destructive. In [2, 12],
Byzantine attacks on sensor networks were studied and a method for attack detection
and classification was proposed, which has been employed to improve the estimation
performance. Asymptotic results were provided as the number of measurements and
the number of sensors increase. In [13], in the presence of false information injection
(spoofing) attacks, several detection-estimation strategies have been proposed to min-
imize the average system estimation mean squared error (MSE). In [14], a heuristic
method was proposed to jointly identify the attacked sensors and estimate the desired
parameter. The attacks might be caused by intentionally injected false data or by
natural phenomena.
The problem of localization in sensor networks under Byzantine or spoofing at-
tacks was studied in [11, 15, 9, 16, 10]. In [11], the optimal Byzantine attack strategies
to compromise a localization system based on quantized sensor data were proposed
and the posterior Cramer-Rao lower bound (PCRLB) for performance evaluation was
3
derived. An approach based on error correcting codes was developed in [15] to miti-
gate Byzantine attacks and estimate the target location. In [10], the identification and
detection of location spoofing attacks on sensor networks based on RSS and beam-
forming estimates have been examined. In [9], a class of approaches was developed to
detect the attacks on a localization sensor network based on quantized data, where
the attack is a combination of man-in-the-middle, hacking, and spoofing attacks. In
[16], median based robust methods were developed to tolerate the bad sensor data
attacked by the adversary, rather than detecting and eliminating them.
In [7], we addressed the issue of false information injection attacks using the
Gaussian mixture model (GMM). The GMM has been used for localization in sensor
networks [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. For example, in [17], centralized and distributed
maximum likelihood based algorithms for location estimation using RSS were pro-
posed. In [22], a nonlinear and nonconvex source localization problem based on RSS
has been relaxed and solved using a semidefinite Gaussian mixture algorithm. How-
ever, in all the work in [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22], analog sensor data have been assumed.
Inspired by [6] and the aforementioned work, which has used the GMM noise
model, we proposed a Maximum Likelihood estimator (MLE) based approach to deal
with quantized received signal strength corrupted by spoofing attacks with a Gaussian
mixture model (Q-RSS-GM). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply
GMM to deal with quantized RSS data. In the dissertation, we also derive the CRLB
for the proposed estimator to evaluate its performance.
It is worth mentioning here that our work on localization based WSNs is com-
posed of two parts. In both parts, we have proposed a source location estimation
approach based on MLE - QRSS assuming a false information injection attack which
can also be called more generally a spoofing attack. In the first part, we assume
that the random attack is i.i.d at different sensors with deterministic parameters for
4
both the attack probability pa and the false information injection signal power σ
2
2. In
contrast to the first part, in the second part we assume that both of the pa and σ
2
2 are
random variables. We assume that the attack probability pa and the attacker signal
power σ22 are following two different uniform distributions. Based on this assump-
tion, we derive the probability mass function for the quantize received signal strength
(QRSS). For both parts, we derive the maximum likelihood estimators based on quan-
tized received signal strength (MLE - QRSS), and in each case we have derived the
corresponding CRLB for the proposed estimator for performance evaluation.
The problem of false information injection attack for linear system has been
studied in [4, 13, 23] and references therein. In [4], the problem of optimal false infor-
mation injection attack in multi-sensor system was investigated. In [4], the attacker
tries to maximize Kalman filter’s estimation error. It was shown that to maximize
the estimation error, the attacker can optimize the power allocation among the sen-
sors, and can optimally design the injected noise error covariance matrix P bb from
the adversary perspective.
In [13], the problem of false information attack detection strategies was investi-
gated for Bayesian estimator. It was assumed that the attacker will use the optimal
attack strategies to maximize the estimation error in case that no detection strategy
was available at the estimation system. The defender aims to minmize the cost func-
tion, which is the trace of the MSE matrix for the estimation error. The proposed
defending strategies depend on two principles. The first is the detection and discard
strategy which will discard the attacked sensor after detection. The second strategy is
detection and incorporation, which will utilize the information of the detected sensor
and improve the MSE based on the available information. The detection and discard
strategy is robust to the mismatch between the detector design assumption and the
real attack parameters.
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Inspired by the previous work [4, 13], we are investigating the solution to the
minimax optimization problem. First, we assumed that the attacker will attack with
a deterministic constant bias, and the attacker is trying to maximize the cost. On
the other hand, the defender will work on minimizing the cost function by trying to
select an optimum detection threshold, under hypothesis H1, when there is an attack,
the distribution of the detector’s test statistic has been derived, which is non-central
Chi squared distribution.
Next, we assume that the attacker will attack with a random noise and in this
case the attacker will try to optimize the attack noise covariance matrix P bb. On
the other hand, the defender will work on minimizing the cost by optimizing the
detection threshold selection. In this case, we use numerical integration to calculate
the detection and miss detection probabilities.
1.2 Contributions
In the first problem of this dissertation, the problem of false information injec-
tion is addressed using Gaussian mixture model in [7]. We have derived the MLE
and its corresponding CRLB. The simulation results show that our proposed estima-
tor provides robust performance under the spoofing attacks. They also show that
the proposed estimator provides an acceptable performance in the case of mismatch
between the nominal (estimated) and the true attack parameters.
The second problem is a natural extension to the first problem. The assumption
of random attack probability and random noise power adopted by the estimator will
make the estimator more robust to a general false information attack. The proposed
estimator is also based on Q-RSS data, and we also derive the CRLB under this more
general assumption for estimator performance evaluation.
In the second problem, we have derived the MLE and its corresponding CRLB.
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In this case the situation is more general and realistic. The simulation results show
that our proposed estimator provides robust performance under the spoofing attack
assumption. They also show that the proposed estimator provides an excellent perfor-
mance in the case of mismatch between the nominal (estimated) and the true attack
parameters.
Note that the work in our dissertation is different from all the work mentioned
earlier in [11, 15, 9, 16, 10]. First, it is different from [11, 15] in that we assume the
sensor network is under spoofing attacks rather than Byzantine attacks. It is different
from [10, 9], since our proposed approach does not try to detect the attacked senors.
Instead, it is a localization approach that is robust under false information injection
attacks, by assuming a certain attack probability. In this sense, our approach adopts
a similar philosophy as that in [16], i.e. developing a robust approach that tolerates
the bad sensor data. However, our work is quite different from [16]. In [16], the
sensor data are assumed to be analog, the sensing modalities include distance (range)
measurements and RF fingerprinting, and the robust approach is based on the median.
In contrast, in this dissertation we propose a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE)
based on quantized received signal strength data subject to false information injection
attacks, by using a Gaussian mixture (GM) model, which can be used to address a
general spoofing attack.
The third problem is a minimax optimization problem from both the attacker
and defender perspectives. The optimal false information attack has been studied in
[4], and the attack detection strategies was investigated in [13]. However, in both of
the previous works and to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate
the minimax problem between the attacker and the defender from both the adversary
and the defender perspectives. We have formulated the relationship between the
attacker and the defender as a minimax optimization problem, where the attacker
7
tries to maximize the cost function of the estimation error for the Bayesian estimator
by controlling the attack bias vector. Whereas, the defender tries to optimize its
defending strategy by selecting the optimum detection threshold that minimizes the
cost function, which is trace of the average mean squared error of the estimator. We
solved the minimax optimization problem numerically. Numerical results show that
when the defender has no knowledge of the attacker power, the optimum strategy
is to always reject the corrupted sensors’ measurements by setting the threshold to
zero. If the defender has a prior knowledge of the attacker power, then the defender
will be able to minimize the attack effect by selecting the optimum threshold which
will depend on the attack power used by the adversary.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a general background
for estimation theory is presented. The estimators and the theoretical bounds for
the estimator’s performance are presented. In Chapter 3, the Maximum Likelihood
estimator based on quantized received signal strength for source location estimation
in the presence of false information attacks, is proposed. The corresponding CRLB is
derived. In Chapter 4, the maximum likelihood estimator based on quantized received
signal strength for the case where the attack probability pa, and the attack power σ
2
2
are random and follow certain distributions, is proposed. The corresponding CRLB
is also derived in this case. In Chapter 5, the relationship between the defender
and the attacker has been modeled as minimax optimization problem for attack on
the Bayesian linear system estimator. Then, a numerical solution for the minimax
problem investigated. Conclusion is presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF ESTIMATION THEORY
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a general background for estimation theory is presented. We start
with the problem of estimating a fixed but unknown parameter from observed data.
This type of estimation problem is also called a non-Bayesian estimation problem.
We present the maximum likelihood estimator, which is a well known non-Bayesian
estimator. Next, we present the case of estimating random parameters from observed
data, which is also called Bayesian estimation problem. We present the Minimum
Mean Squared Error (MMSE) as an estimation criterion for this case which we also
will use later in our dissertation. We discuss the estimator performance measure Mean
Squared Error (MSE), as well as the Fisher information matrix (FIM) and the Cramer
Rao Lower Bound (CRLB). Biased and unbiased estimators are also discussed.
2.2 Non-Bayesian Estimation
Estimating an unknown deterministic parameter is a subject that has a wide
range of applications. For example, the localization problem in wireless sensor net-
work (WSNs). In the localization problem, our objective is to estimate the source
location θ̂(Z) based on observed sensor measurements Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T , where N is
the number of measurements, which are usually considered to be independent and
identically distributed i.i.d and follow a statistical model f(Z|θ). According to the
i.i.d assumption the joint likelihood function L(Z|θ) can be found as [24]
9
L(Z|θ) = f(Z|θ) =
N∏
i=1
f(θ|Z) (2.1)
For simplicity of calculation it is also common to write the likelihood function eq.(2.1)
in the logarithm form as
logL(Z|θ) =
N∑
i=1
log f(θ|Z) (2.2)
Now the objective is to find the estimate θ̂(Z) based on the observed data Z, we
denote for θ here as bold symbol since we are considering the estimation of a vector
of unknown deterministic parameters.
For the unknown deterministic parameter, a widely used estimator to estimate
the parameter θ based on the likelihood or log-likelihood function is called the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator (MLE) which tries to maximize the log-likelihood function
over the prameter θ as [24], [25]
θ̂ = arg max
θ
log f(Z|θ) (2.3)
Thus, we have defined the process for estimating any unknown deterministic param-
eters based on received non-linear random data and the likelihood function. The
(MLE) can be applied and it can find the estimate for all kinds of measurements
with.
Next, we will present the estimator’s evaluation methods.
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2.3 Bayesian Estimation
Let us suppose that we have a set of measuremements Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T , with a
likelihood function f(Z|θ), where θ is the vector of the parameters to be estimated.
Suppose we also have the prior probability density function f(θ), then using the
Bayes’ theorem the posterior distribution can be written as [25]
f(θ|Z) = f(Z|θ)f(θ)
f(Z)
(2.4)
where
f(Z) =
∫
f(Z|θ)f(θ)dθ (2.5)
Note that the denominator in the Bayes’ formula does not depend on θ and can be
considered as a constant c, and that the posterior PDF is proportional likelihood
function f(Z|θ) and the prior pdf f(θ) as
f(θ|Z) = 1
c
L(Z|θ)f(θ) (2.6)
where L(θ) = f(Z|θ) is the likelihood function of θ. Thus, the posterior can be
calculated from the Bayes’ formula based on the observed data Z and the prior pdf
f(θ). A well known Bayesian estimator is the maximum a posteriori estimator (MAP)
which maximize the posterior pdf over θ. Another popular Bayesian estimator is the
conditional mean E[θ|Z] mean E[θ|Z] which is also known as the minimum mean
squared error (MMSE) as
11
E[θ|Z] =
∫
θf(θ|Z)dθ =
∫
θL(Z|θ)f(θ)dθ∫
L(Z|θ)f(θ)dθ
(2.7)
In this dissertation we will use the MMSE estimator for linear measurements subjected
to an injected false information. Next, we will give a background of the MMSE
derivation based on linear measurements.
2.3.1 Bayesian Estimation in Linear and Gaussian Systems
In this section, the widely used linear system model is presented and the MMSE
estimator is presented along with the covariance matrix under the assumption of
Gaussian measurements. Since we will use the MMSE in linear system in Chapter
5 so we find it important to give a brief introduction to the MMSE estimator under
linear system in this chapter to make our work more self - contained.
Suppose we have a set of observed data z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T , z′is are i.i.d measure-
ments and
z = Hx+w (2.8)
the above model is widely used model for linear systems. It is common to denote
x as the state vector, and w as the noise vector. H is the measurements matrix,
and z is the measurements vector. Since we are considering the Bayesian case, the
state vector to be estimated is assumed to be random parameter with a Gaussin
prior as x ∼ N(x̄,P xx), where x̄ is the mean and the P xx = E[(x− x̄)(x− x̄)T ] is
the covariance matrix of the state vector respectively. w ∼ N(w̄,Pww) is denoted
as the sensor measurements noise and has a Gaussian distribution with w̄ mean
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and covariance matrix Pww = E[(w − w̄)(w − w̄)T ] respectively. Let x and w be
independent thus
x
w
 ∼ N

 x̄
w̄
 ,
P xx 0
0 P ww

 (2.9)
By using matrix form, the system equations can be written as
x
z
 =
 I 0
H I

x
w
 (2.10)
then the measurements mean E[z] can be written as
E[z] = HE[x] + E[w] = Hx̄+ w̄ (2.11)
The covariance matrix for the measurements Pzz = E[(z− z̄)(z− z̄)T ] can be calcu-
lated as
E
x− x̄
z − z̄

x− x̄
z − z̄

T
=
 I 0
H I

Pxx 0
0 Pww

 I 0
H I

T
=
 Pxx PxxHT
HPxx HPxxH
T + Pww

(2.12)
Thus, Pzz = E[(z − z̄)(z − z̄)T ] can be written as
Pzz = E[(z − z̄)(z − z̄)T ] = HPxxHT + Pww (2.13)
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and the mutual covariance which is Pxz = E[(x − x̄)(z − z̄)T ] = [E[(x − x̄)T (z −
z̄)]]T = PxxH
T = Pzx
T . We can notice that the measurements covariance Pzz is a
combination of the state covariance HPxxH
T and the noise covariance matrix Pww
under the assumption of an i.i.d measurements. For jointly Gaussian vector then the
conditional mean E[x|Z] is given as [25]
E[x|Z] := x̂ = x̄+ PxzPzz−1(z − z̄) (2.14)
also the conditional covariance matrix is given as
Cov(x|Z) := Pxx|z = Pxx − PxzPzz−1Pzx (2.15)
Thus, we have presented the fundamental theory and equations for the MMSE Bayesian
estimator. In Chapter 5 we will use the presented equations for investigating the
problem of false data injection on linear systems.
Next, we will present the methods for evaluating the performance of an estimator.
2.4 Mean Squared Error - MSE
In this Section, the Mean squared error (MSE) method for evaluating the perfor-
mance of an estimator presented. First, the case of unknown deterministic parameter
(non-Bayesian) MSE presented. The MSE for the multiple parameters is also pre-
sented, and the biased and unbiased estimators are explained. Also, the relationship
between the MSE and the variance is explained. Next, the MSE for unknown random
variable (Bayesian) is also presented.
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2.4.1 Non Bayesian Mean Squared Error - NBMSE
In this section, the mean squared error for estimator evaluation is presented. The
mean squared error for single parameter non-Bayesian estimator is defined as [25]
E(θ̂(Z)− θ)2 = E(θ̂2(Z)− 2 θ θ̂(Z) + θ2) (2.16)
where Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T is the measurement vector. Simplifying the above equation,
one can have
E(θ̂2)− 2θE(θ̂) + E(θ2) = E(θ̂2)− [E(θ̂)]2 + [E(θ̂)]2 − 2 θ E(θ̂) + θ2 = V ar(θ̂) + [E(θ̂)− θ]2
(2.17)
Thus we notice that the MSE is a composed of the variance and the square of the
estimator bias
E(θ̂(Z)− θ)2 = V ar(θ̂(Z)) + [E(θ̂(Z))− θ]2 (2.18)
In this dissertation, we use the mean squared error (MSE) criterion to evaluate
the MLE estimator performance and compare it with the Cramer Rao lower bound
(CRLB) which we will discuss later in this chapter.
Next, the MSE matrix for an estimation problem with a n-dimensional parameter
is provided as follows
E[θ̂(Z)− θ][θ̂(Z)− θ]T = Cov(θ̂(Z),θ) +Bias Matrix (2.19)
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Then let’s assume θ = [θ1 θ2 ... θn]
T then θ̂(Z) = [θ̂1(Z) θ̂2(Z) ... θ̂n(Z)]
T . Let
Ψ1 = (θ̂1(Z)− θ1) (2.20)
Ψ2 = (θ̂2(Z)− θ2) (2.21)
. (2.22)
. (2.23)
Ψ3 = (θ̂3(Z)− θn) (2.24)
Thus, the MSE matrix can be written as
E[Ψ1 Ψ2 ... Ψn][Ψ1 Ψ2 ... Ψn]
T = E

Ψ21 Ψ1Ψ2 ... Ψ1Ψn
Ψ2Ψ1 Ψ
2
2 ... Ψ2Ψn
: : ... :
ΨnΨ1 ΨnΨ2 ... Ψ
2
n

(2.25)
Note that the MSE matrix is a symmetric matrix. So, the expectation for each in
element in the above matrix with considering the symmetric parameters can be found
as
E(Ψ21) = E(θ̂1(Z)− θ1(Z))2 = V ar(θ̂1(Z)) + [E(θ̂1(Z))− θ1]2 (2.26)
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Similarly the E(Ψ22) and E(Ψ
2
n) can be calculated as
E(Ψ22) = E(θ̂2 − θ2)2 = V ar(θ̂2) + [E(θ̂2)− θ2]2 (2.27)
: (2.28)
: (2.29)
E(Ψ2n) = E(θ̂3 − θn)2 = V ar(θ̂n) + [E(θ̂n)− θn]2 (2.30)
Next, the expectation of the off diagonal elements which represents the covariance
and the bias components for MSE matrix can be determined as follows
E(Ψ1Ψ2) = E([θ̂1(Z)−θ1][θ̂2(Z)−θ2]) = E(θ̂1(Z)θ̂2(Z)− θ̂1(Z)θ2−θ1θ̂2(Z)+θ1θ2)
= E(θ̂1(Z)θ̂2(Z))− E(θ̂1(Z)θ2)− E(θ1θ̂2(Z)) + E(θ1θ2)
= Cov(θ̂1(Z), θ̂2(Z))− E(θ̂1(Z))θ2 − θ1E(θ̂2(Z)) + θ1θ2 (2.31)
So, it is obvious that the mutual MSE elements is a combination of the covarince of
the two elements plus a bias component. Here, the bias components denoted as B.
Following the same procedure in eq.(2.15), it is possible to calculate the elements of
the MSE matrix. Here, the elements will be denoted as V ar(θ̂(Z)), Cov(θ̂(Z)), and
bias as B. Following is the elements of the covariance and the bias matrix.
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c11 = V ar(θ̂1(Z))
c22 = V ar(θ̂2(Z))
:
:
cnn = V ar(θ̂n(Z))
c12 = c21 = Cov(θ̂1(Z), θ̂2(Z))
:
:
c1n = cn1 = Cov(θ̂1(Z), θ̂n(Z))
:
:
c2n = cn2 = Cov(θ̂2(Z), θ̂n(Z)) (2.32)
Thus, the covariance matrix elements of the MSE found. Next, the bias B matrix
elements of the MSE matrix can be calculated as
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B11 = [E(θ̂1)− θ1]2
B22 = [E(θ̂2)− θ2]2
:
:
Bnn = [E(θ̂n)− θn]2
B12 = B21 = [θ1 θ2 − E(θ̂1)θ2 − θ1E(θ̂2)]
:
:
B1n = Bn1 = [θ1 θn − E(θ̂1)θn − θ1E(θ̂n)]
:
:
B2n = Bn2 = [θ2 θn − E(θ̂2)θn − θ2E(θ̂n)] (2.33)
Then, the MSE matrix can be written as follows
E[θ̂ − θ][θ̂ − θ]T =

c11 c12 ... c1n
c21 c22 ... c2n
: : ... :
cn1 cn2 ... cnn

+

B11 B12 ... B1n
B21 B22 ... B2n
: : ... :
Bn1 Bn2 ... Bnn

(2.34)
which represents the covariance matrix and the bias of the estimator. For unbiased
estimators then B = 0. In other words, for unbiased estimator the MSE is equal to
19
the covariance of the estimator.
In this dissertation, the MSE method will be used for evaluating the performance
of the proposed MLE estimators. Next, the MSE for the Bayesian estimator will be
presented.
2.4.2 Bayesian Mean Square Error - BMSE
For the unknown random parameter estimator also known as Bayesian estimator
the MSE is defined as [25]
MSE[θ̂(Z)] := E[(θ̂(Z)− θ)2] (2.35)
where θ̂(Z) is the Bayesian estimate based on the observed sensor measurements
vector Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T , and θ is the true value of the random parameter which has
a prior pdf p(θ). The expectation in the above equation will be calculated over the
joint pdf of Z measurements and the prior pdf of random parameter p(θ).
For the MMSE estimator, the relationship between the MSE and the conditional
variance can be explained as follows. The MSE for the MMSE estimator conditioned
on a certain set Z measurements can be written as [25]
E[(θ̂MMSE(Z)− θ)2|Z] = E[(θ − E(θ|Z))2|Z] = V ar(θ|Z) (2.36)
which is the conditional variance V ar(θ|Z). Since the expectations are calculated
with respect to f(θ|Z) for the equations above, then averaging over Z yields
E[V ar(θ|Z)] = E[(θ − E[θ|Z])2] (2.37)
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which also equal to the unconditional MSE given in eq.(1st) for the MMSE estimator.
Next, the non - Bayesian and the Bayesian Fisher information matrix ( FIM ) will be
presented.
2.5 Fisher Information Matrix
2.5.1 Non Bayesian Fisher Information Matrix - NBFIM
For non - Bayesian unknown deterministic vector parameters θ, with an estimate
based of the random sensors measurements θ̂(Z). The Fisher information is defined
as :
I(θ) := −E
[
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
]
= E
[(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ
)2]
(2.38)
where f(Z|θ) is the likelihood function, it is clear that the Fisher information is
calculated at the true values of θ. Let θ = [θ1 θ2 θ3]
T is the true parameters vector,
and ∇ = [ ∂f
∂θ1
∂f
∂θ2
∂f
∂θ3
] is the gradient vector . The Hessian matrix for the FIM can be
described as
∇θ∇Tθ log f(Z|θ) =

∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1θ2
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1θ3
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2θ1
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ22
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2θ3
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3θ1
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3θ2
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ23
 (2.39)
The equality of the two terms in eq.(2.19) can be proven for single element as follows
− E
[
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
]
= −E
[
1
f(Z|θ)
∂2f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
+
−1
f(Z|θ)2
(
∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)2]
(2.40)
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the expectation for the 1st term of eq.(2.21) can be calculated as
−E
[
1
f(Z|θ)
∂2f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
]
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
1
f(Z|θ)
∂2f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
f(Z|θ) dz
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
∂2f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
dz
(2.41)
using the differentiation and integral interchangeable property and since
∫∞
−∞ f(Z|θ) dz =
1 we get
− ∂
2
∂θ21
∫ ∞
−∞
f(Z|θ) dz = −
∂2
∂θ21
[1] = 0 (2.42)
sub. eq.(2.23) in eq.(2.21) and using ∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
= f(Z|θ) ∂ log f(Z|θ)
θ1
, yields
− E
[
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
2
]
= E
[(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
θ1
)2]
(2.43)
Thus, the equality of eq.(2.19) proved. Now, eq.(2.19) can be also shown valid for the
off - diagonal elements of the FIM matrix as
−E
[
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1∂θ2
]
= −E
[
1
f(Z|θ)
∂2f(Z|θ)
∂θ1∂θ2
+
−1
f(Z|θ)
1
f(Z|θ)
(
∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)(
∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
) (2.44)
following the same procedures for eq.(2.23), the first term of eq.(2.25) is shown equal
to zero. And using ∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
= ∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
f(Z|θ) and ∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
= ∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
f(Z|θ) , yields
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− E
[
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1∂θ2
]
= E
[(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
)]
(2.45)
now we can write the FIM matrix as
−E[∇∇T log f(Z|θ)] = −E

∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ21
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1θ2
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1θ3
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2θ1
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ22
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2θ3
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3θ1
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3θ2
∂2 log f(Z|θ)
∂θ23

= E

(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
θ1
)2 (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
) (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3
)
(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
)(
∂ log f(Z,θ1)
∂θ1
) (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
θ2
)2 (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3
)
(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
) (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ3
)(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ2
) (
∂ log f(Z|θ)
θ3
)2

(2.46)
Thus the non - Bayesian NB-FIM calculated . In next section, The Bayesian ( NB-
CRLB ) will be presented
2.5.2 Non - Bayesian Cramer Rao Lower Bound ( NB - CRLB )
For unbiased deterministic parameters, it is known form section 2 that the mean
of the estimation error is equal to 0. According to that assumption the CRLB is
defined as the minimum limit that the MSE or the Variance of the estimator can
achieve. The estimator considered efficient if it achieves the CRLB bound. The
CRLB for unbiased estimator of a vector of unknown deterministic parameters based
on N observed sensor measurements Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T is defined as
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E[ [θ̂(Z)− θ0][θ̂(Z)− θ0]T ] ≥ J−1 (2.47)
where θ̂(Z) is the estimated value for vector parameters, and θ is the true value of
the parameters, and J is the non - Bayesian fisher information matrix ( NB-FIM )
calculated in previous section.
The proof of the non Bayesian ( NB - CRLB ) for single element of the estimated
vector θ̂(Z) which is the element θ̂1 can be done by using the assumption that the
mean for the estimation error under unbiased estimator is equal to 0 as
E[θ̂1(z)− θ1] =
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1] f(Z|θ) dz = 0 (2.48)
deriving eq.(2.29) with respect to θ1, yields
∂
∂θ1
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1] f(Z|θ) dz =
∫ ∞
−∞
∂
∂θ1
{[θ̂1(Z)− θ1] f(Z|θ)} dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]
∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
dz +
∫ ∞
−∞
[−1] f(Z|θ) dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]
∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
dz − 1 = 0
(2.49)
using ∂f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
= ∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
f(Z|θ) , we get
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1] f(Z|θ)
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]
dz = 1 (2.50)
eq.(2.31) can be rewritten as
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∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]
√
f(Z|θ)
√
f(Z|θ)
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]
dz = 1 (2.51)
square both sides of the eq.(2.32) as
[∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]
√
f(Z|θ)
√
f(Z|θ)
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]
dz
]2
=
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]2 f(Z|θ) dz
∫ ∞
−∞
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]2
f(Z|θ) dz = 1
(2.52)
using Cauchy - Schwartz inequality [
∫
f.
∫
g ≥ (
∫
f g)2], yields
∫ ∞
−∞
[θ̂1(z)− θ1]2 f(Z|θ) dz
∫ ∞
−∞
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]2
f(Z|θ) dz ≥ 1 (2.53)
it is obvious from eq.(2.34) that
∫∞
−∞[θ̂1(Z)− θ1]
2 f(Z|θ) dz = E[(θ̂1(Z)− θ1)2] and∫∞
−∞
[
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
]2
f(Z|θ) dz = E
[(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)2]
= FIM , then it is clea that the
CRLB is
E[(θ̂1(Z)− θ1)2] ≥ E
[(
∂ log f(Z|θ)
∂θ1
)2]−1
(2.54)
which proves the non Bayesian ( NB - CRLB ). Next, the Bayesian Fisher information
matrix ( B - FIM ) and the Bayesian CRLB ( B - CRLB ) also known as Postrior
CRLB ( PCRLB ) will be presented.
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2.5.3 Bayesian Fisher Information Matrix ( B-FIM )
Let θ be a random vector with prior pdf f(θ), then the Baysian FIM ( B - FIM
) is given as
JB = E[−∆θθ log f(Z,θ)] (2.55)
where ∆θθ := ∇θ∇Tθ , and ∇θ = [ ∂∂θ1
∂
∂θ2
∂
∂θ3
]T , Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T is the sensors mea-
surements vector, and
f(Z,θ) = f(Z|θ) f(θ) (2.56)
where f(θ) is the prior information probability of the random variable, and f(Z|θ)
is the likelihood function of the system.
Thus, it is obvious that the above FIM is a combination of two additive FIMs
one with respect to the likelihood averaged over the prior probability f(θ) and the
other is with respect to the prior probability information as [26, 27, 28]
JB = E[−∆θθ log f(Z|θ)] + E[−∆θθ log f(θ)] = Jd + Jp (2.57)
where
Jp := E[−∆θθ log f(θ)] (2.58)
is the apriori information, and
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Jd := E[−∆θθ log f(Z|θ)] (2.59)
where Jd can be also considered as the non - Bayesian ( NB - FIM ) averaged of prior
pdf as
Jd := E[−∆θθ log f(D|θ)] =
∫
θ
Jf(θ)dθ (2.60)
where J is the standard FIM derived in non-Bayesian case. Next, the Bayesian CRLB
( B - CRLB) also called a posterior CRLB ( PCRLB ) will be presented.
2.5.4 Bayesian CRLB ( Poterior CRLB )
For Bayesian parameter, the Bayesian Fisher information matrix ( B - FIM )
used to calculate the (BCRLB ) also claaed ( PCRLB) . The Bayesian CRLB is given
as
E[(θ̂(Z)− θ)(θ̂(Z)− θ)T ] ≥ JB−1 (2.61)
where JB is the Bayesian Fisher information matrix ( B - FIM ) calculated in the
previous section.
2.6 Consistency and Efficiency of an estimator
For an unknown deterministic non - Bayesian case, an estimator is called con-
sistent if it is eventually converges to the true value of the estimate and it might be
determined by using some stochastic criteia like the mean squared criteria to deter-
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mine the consistency as in [25]
lim
n→∞
E[(θ̂(n,Zn)− θ0)2] = 0 (2.62)
where θ̂(n,Zn) is the estimate , θ0 is the true value of the deterministic parameter,
Z = [z1, ..., zN ]
T is the sensor measurements vector, and the expectation will be
calculated with respect to the likelihood function f(Zn|θ0).
For the the random unknown parameters also called Bayesian parameters, the
estimator will be called consistent if the estimated value eventually converges to the
true value of the random parameter θ, and it might also be measured using the MSE
criteria as in [25]
lim
n→∞
E[(θ̂(n,Zn)− θ)2] = 0 (2.63)
where the expectation in the above equation will be calculated with respect to the
joint pdf f(Zn, θ) = f(Zn|θ)f(θ).
For the efficiency of the estimator, an estimator is called efficient if its variance
attains to the Cramer Rao Lower Bound ( CRLB ).
28
CHAPTER 3
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SOURCE LOCATION ESTIMATOR
UNDER FALSE INFORMATION INJECTION ATTACKS WITH
KNOWN ATTACK POWER AND PROBABILITY
In this chapter, we first formulate the localization problem in a sensor network
using QRSS data which are corrupted by noise injected by an adversary with known
attack parameters. We introduce the GM model and derive the pmf for the quantized
sensor data under the GMM false information injection attack. After that, we derive
the maximum likelihood estimator for the proposed source localization problem, and
finally we derive the CRLB for the proposed estimator for performance evaluation.
3.1 Mathematical Model
The proposed method can handle any sensor deployment. For simplicity, we
consider in this dissertation the uniform sensor deployment as shown in Fig. 1. The
target signal intensity attenuation is inversely proportional to the distance from the
target with some exponent. We assume an isotropic signal attenuation model as in
[6]:
a2i =
GiP
′
0
( di
d0
)n
(3.1)
where ai is the signal amplitude at the ith sensor, P
′
0 is the radiated power by the
target at a reference distance d0, Gi is the gain of the ith sensor, and d
n
i is the
Euclidean distance between the target and the ith sensor as given below:
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di =
√
(xi − xt)2 + (yi − yt)2 (3.2)
The combinations (xi, yi) and (xt, yt) are the coordinates of the ith sensor and the
target location respectively, and n is the attenuation exponent. For simplicity, we
assume that Gi = G, ∀i, and P0 = GP
′
0. We also assume that d0 = 1m. Then (3.1)
can be rewritten as:
a2i =
P0
(di)n
(3.3)
We assume that the presence of a target in the sensor grid with N sensors with
known locations as shown in Fig.1, has been detected correctly, and the distance be-
tween the target and any sensor is at least d0. The isotropic power attenuation model
has been used widely for modeling signal attenuation for acoustic and electromagnetic
waves propagation [6, 29, 30, 31, 32].
Fig. 1. The sensor deployment in the ROI.
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As illustrated in Fig.2, we follow the same strategy for collecting sensors readings
which has been developed in [6]. The amplitude at the ith sensor ai will be attacked
and corrupted by noise that follows a GM model, which can be considered as an
impulsive noise or a biased noise injected by an attacker. The signal at each sensor
is modeled by:
ri = ai + bi (3.4)
where ri is the received signal by the ith sensor, ai is the amplitude of the uncorrupted
signal, and bi is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise that follows
GM distribution, which affects all the sensors independently.
bi ∼
K∑
k=1
wi,kN (0, σ2k) (3.5)
where wi,k is the weight of the kth Gaussian component with zero mean and variance
σ2k, and K is the number of Gaussian components, which in our proposed work is set
as 2. We denote pa as the attack probability, which is the same for all the sensors,
and pa = wi,2 and wi,1 = (1 − wi,2). We also assume that σ22 >> σ21, meaning that
the injected noise is much stronger than the sensor measurement noise.
After having the signal model we are now ready to derive the likelihood for the
estimation problem.
3.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimator Based on Quantized Data
In this section, we derive the likelihood function based on the quantized multi-
bit data by using the received signal model Q-RSS-GM, presented earlier in this
chapter. First, let us denote the desired parameter to be estimated is θ = [P0 xt yt]
T ,
which consists of the target signal strength and its location coordinates. We assume
31
Fig. 2. The system diagram.
that each sensor quantizes its received sensor measurements into M -bit data according
to a certain threshold and sends them to the fusion center, which we denote as D =
[D1, · · · , DN ]T , where Di ∈ {0, · · · , 2M − 1}. For simplicity, we denote L = 2M . The
quantization thresholds set is ηi = [ηi0, ηi1, ..., ηiL]
T , where ηi0 = −∞ and ηiL = ∞,
and the quantization process can be performed as follows:
Di =

0 −∞ ≤ ri < ηi1
1 ηi1 ≤ ri < ηi2
: :
: :
L− 1 ηL−1 ≤ ri <∞
(3.6)
According to the Gaussian Mixture model, the probability that Di takes a specific
value l can be derived as:
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pil(ηi,θ) =
K∑
k=1
wi,k
[
Q
(
ηil − ai
σk
)
−Q
(
ηil+1 − ai
σk
)]
(3.7)
where l ∈ {0, · · · , L−1}, and Q(x) = 1√
2π
∫∞
x
e−
t2
2 dt is the complementary cumulative
distribution function of the standard Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance.
Now the joint probability of the sensor data can be found as follows
p (D|θ) =
N∏
i=1
L−1∏
l=0
pil(ηi,θ)
δ(Di−l) (3.8)
where δ(.) is the Kronecker delta function. The log-likelihood function is therefore
log p(D|θ) =
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l) log pil(ηi,θ) (3.9)
We tries to maximize the log-likelihood function over θ. So the ML estimator is
θ̂ = arg max
θ
log p(D|θ) (3.10)
Next, we derive the CRLB for this estimation problem.
3.3 Cramer Rao Lower Bound (CRLB) for the proposed MLE
In this section we will derive the CRLB for the proposed MLE-QRSS-GMM for
performance evaluation.
Theorem 1 : For an unbiased estimator θ̂(D), the CRLB is given by
E
{
[θ̂(D)− θ][θ̂(D)− θ]T
}
≥ J−1 (3.11)
where J is the 3× 3 Fisher information matrix (FIM).
Proof: The following is the proof of Theorem 1, which provides the FIM for the
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localization problem subjected to the GMM attack assumption.
J = −E[∇θ∇Tθ log p(D|θ)] (3.12)
where ∇θ is the gradient vector:
∇θ =
[
∂
∂P0
∂
∂xt
∂
∂yt
]T
(3.13)
the Fisher information matrix J can be described as
J = −E[∇θ∇Tθ log p(D|θ)] = −E

∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂P0
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂x2t
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂yt∂P0
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂yt∂xt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
 =

j11 j12 j13
j21 j22 j23
j31 j32 j33

(3.14)
from (3.9) we have the log - likelihood function as
log p(D|θ) =
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l) log pil(ηi,θ) (3.15)
then, each element of the above matrix will be calculated as follows ,
the 1st derivative for the matrix element (1,1)
∂ log p(D|θ)
∂P0
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]
(3.16)
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and the 2nd derivative will be
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
(3.17)
Next, we calculate the (1,1) element of J.
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
p2il(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂2pil(ηi,θ)
∂P 20
] (3.18)
and
j11 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
(3.19)
by using the identity E[δ(Di − l)] = pil(ηi,θ). Next we find
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
as
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
=
K∑
k=1
wi,k
γi,l,k
2
√
2πσkaidni
(3.20)
where
γi,l,k =
[
e
− (ηil−ai)
2
2σ2
k − e
−
(ηil+1−ai)
2
2σ2
k
]
(3.21)
Then
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
=
[∑K
k=1wi,k
γi,l,k
2
√
2πσkaid
n
i
]2
(3.22)
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By substituting (3.22) in (3.19), we get
j11 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
=
N∑
i=1
βia
−2
i d
−2n
i (3.23)
where
βi =
1
8π
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
K∑
k=1
wi,k
γi,l,k
σk
]2
(3.24)
Similarly, we can find the j12 which is equal to j21 elements since the FIM matrix is
symmetric
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
]
(3.25)
then, j12 = j21:
j12 = j21 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
(3.26)
Since we know the ∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
from (3.20). Next we find ∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
as
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
=
K∑
k=1
wi,k
naid
−2
i γi,l,k
2
√
2πσk
(xi − xt) (3.27)
Then
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[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
=
[
K∑
k=1
wi,k
γi,l,k
2
√
2πσkaidni
][
K∑
k=1
wi,k
naid
−2
i γi,l,k
2
√
2πσk
(xi − xt)
]
(3.28)
By substituting (3.28) in (3.26), we get
j12 = j21 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
= n
N∑
i=1
βid
−(n+2)
i (xi − xt) (3.29)
Next, the j22 element of the FIM matrix can be found as
j22 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂x2t
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂pil(ηi, θ)
∂xt
]2
(3.30)
Thus,
j22 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)2 (3.31)
Next, Calculating the j13 = j31 elements
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
]
(3.32)
then j13 = j31 as:
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j13 = j31 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
(3.33)
where
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
=
K∑
k=1
wi,k
naid
−2
i γi,l,k
2
√
2πσk
(yi − yt) (3.34)
Then, j13 = j31 elements
j13 = j31 = n
N∑
i=1
βid
−(n+2)
i (yi − yt) (3.35)
Now, calculating the elements j23 = j32:
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
]
(3.36)
then j23 = j32
j23 = j32 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
(3.37)
Thus, j13 = j31 elements
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j23 = j32 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)(yi − yt) (3.38)
finally, calculating the j33 element
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
]
(3.39)
then j33 :
j33 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂pil(ηi, θ)
∂yt
]2
(3.40)
Thus,
j33 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (yi − yt)2 (3.41)
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Thus the elements of the FIM are provided as
j11 =
N∑
i=1
βid
−2n
i a
−2
i
j12 = j21 = n
N∑
i=1
βid
−(n+2)
i (xi − xt)
j13 = j31 = n
N∑
i=1
βid
−(n+2)
i (yi − yt)
j22 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)2
j23 = j32 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)(yi − yt)
j33 = n
2
N∑
i=1
βia
2
i d
−4
i (yi − yt)2
(3.42)
where
βi =
1
8π
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
K∑
k=1
wi,k
γi,l,k
σk
]2
(3.43)
and
γi,l,k =
[
e
− (ηil−ai)
2
2σ2
k − e
−
(ηil+1−ai)
2
2σ2
k
]
(3.44)
Once the FIM is obtained, the CRLB matrix can be readily calculated, by taking
the inverse of the FIM.
3.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulation results of the proposed Q-RSS-GM
estimator. We will compare the Q-RSS-GM estimator with the MLE based on the
nominal model ignoring any possible false information attacks as in [6], and with
the CRLB derived in Section 4.2. A systematic grid search is employed to find an
initial state estimate, then we use the nonlinear optimization function in MATLAB
to find the MLE θ̂ = [P̂0 x̂t ŷt]
T . We assume a uniform sensor deployment with
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known sensor locations in a 200 × 200 m2 region of interest. The true target state
vector is θ = [25000 15 20]. The GMM parameters used for the attack are assumed
to be known with σ1 = 1, σ2 = 10, and µ1 = µ2 = 0. The performance of our
proposed method is evaluated in terms of the root mean squared error (RMSE) for
the estimated parameters. The simulation is based on 1000 Monte-Carlo runs with the
sensor square root number ranging from 8 to 20. We use the quaternary quantization
with M = 2, the attenuation parameter is n = 2. The quantization threshold is set
as ηi = [0.82, 1.7, 2.72]
T , ∀i.
In Fig. 2, the RMSE of the Q-RSS-GM estimator is plotted as a function of the
attack probability pa, which takes one of the values in the following vector
[0.01 0.0246 0.0605 0.1488 0.3659 0.9]T .
It is assumed that N = 144 sensors are deployed in the ROI for this simulation.
Note that the increase in attack probability will lead to an increase in the RMSE and
the corresponding CRLB in general. It is also clear that the proposed Q-RSS-GM
approach provides much better estimation performance especially when the attack
probability is large.
In Fig. 3, the RMSE of the Q-RSS-GM estimator is plotted as a function of
the number of sensors. The attack probability is assumed to be pa = 0.03. The
performance of the proposed Q-RSS-GM estimator is compared with that of the
nominal MLE from [6] under the same situation, and the derived CRLB. It is clear
that our proposed Q-RSS-GM estimator outperforms the nominal MLE that ignores
the attacks. The system performance improves with increasing number of sensors and
the RMSE of the proposed Q-RSS-GM estimator approaches the CRLB for all the
estimated parameters.
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Fig. 3. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors (pa = 0.03) .
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Fig. 4. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors (pa = 0.3).
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Similar to Fig. 3, in Fig. 4 the RMSE of the Q-RSS-GM estimator is plotted
as a function of the number of sensors. However, the attack probability is increased
ten-fold to pa = 0.3. The RMSE of the Q-RSS-GM estimator is compared with that of
the nominal method and the CRLB. Note that a larger attack probability will mislead
the nominal method more significantly with a much larger RMSE while the proposed
method is still able to converge to the CRLB and provide acceptable performance,
especially when the number of the deployed sensors increases. The probability of
attack (pa = 0.3) is considered to be very high since the attacker in this case is
assumed to have enough resources to corrupt 30% of the sensors in the ROI.
In Fig.5, the RMSE of the Q-RSS-GM estimator is plotted as a function of
the attack probability pa, which takes one of the values in the following vector
[0.01 0.0246 0.0605 0.1488 0.3659 0.9]T . It is assumed that N = 144 sensors are
deployed in the ROI for this simulation. Note that the increase in attack probability
will lead to an increase in the RMSE and the corresponding CRLB in general. It is
also clear that the proposed Q-RSS-GM approach provides much better estimation
performance especially when the attack probability is large.
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Fig. 5. The RMSE vs. the probability of attack (pa).
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In Tables 1, 2, and 3, we show the performance of a Q-RSS-GM estimator
which we have designed assuming a nominal attack probability of pan = 0.05. Then
we assume that the adversary uses a different actual attack probability pat . We test
the performance of the estimator with a mismatched parameter pa, and observe its
response to various actual pat ’s. It is clear that the estimator works perfectly when the
actual attack probability pat is less than or equal to pan = 0.05, which is the nominal
attack probability by design. Note that the estimator is still able to give very good
performance even when the actual attack probability is increased to pat = 0.1. These
results show that the proposed approach is robust against parameter mismatch.
Table 1. RMSE of P0 for the Q-RSS-GM estimator with a mismatched pa
N pat = 0 pat = 0.01 pat = 0.05 pat = 0.1
144 2505.1 2505.6 2594.9 2714.0
256 1827.2 1847.0 1912.2 2026.6
400 1449.6 1460.3 1493.2 1571.1
Table 2. RMSE of xt for the Q-RSS-GM estimator with a mismatched pa
N pat = 0 pat = 0.01 pat = 0.05 pat = 0.1
144 4.0614 4.1942 4.4723 4.6697
256 3.0083 3.0859 3.3337 3.4781
400 2.3707 2.4047 2.7200 2.8098
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Table 3. RMSE of yt for the Q-RSS-GM estimator with a mismatched pa
N pat = 0 pat = 0.01 pat = 0.05 pat = 0.1
144 4.1767 4.1357 4.4543 4.7472
256 3.0306 3.0286 3.2758 3.5819
400 2.4028 2.4592 2.4864 2.7359
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CHAPTER 4
SOURCE LOCATION ESTIMATION UNDER FALSE INFORMATION
ATTACK WITH UNKNOWN ATTACK POWER AND PROBABILITY
In this Chapter, we investigate the problem of source location estimation in wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) based on quantized data in the presence of false information
attacks. We assume that the attack power and probability is unknown for the system,
we develop a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) to locate the source with sensor
data corrupted by injected false information. The Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB)
for this estimation problem is also derived to evaluate the estimator’s performance. It
is shown that the proposed estimator is robust in various cases with the attack proba-
bility and power following a uniform distribution, and it shows excellent performance
under the mismatch case.
4.1 Mathematical Modeling
In this section, we use the same mathematical model for the target as in (3.3). We
assume here the false information signal is following a randomized Gaussian mixture
model RGMM, then the probability density function (pdf) of bi can be modeled as
f(bi, pa, σ
2
2) = f(bi|pa, σ22) f(pa, σ22) (4.1)
where bi is the injected false information, pa and σ
2
2 are the attack probability and
the attack power respectively, and f(pa, σ
2
2) is the joint pdf of the attack probability
and the attack power.
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We assume that pa and σ
2
2 are independent and identically distributed i.i.d. We
also assume that there are constraints on the pa and σ
2
2, and both of them follow
certain uniform distributions.
f(pa) =

1
α
0 ≤ pa ≤ α
0 o.w
(4.2)
where α is the upper limit for the probability of attack pa which can be assigned
according to the possible percentage of the sensors, which the attacker or noise is
able to corrupt or control in the targeted WSN.
f(σ22) =

1
ρ−σ21
σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ ρ
0 o.w
(4.3)
where ρ is the upper limit for the attack noise power σ22, which can also be
assigned according to the power of the attacker or noise in the targeted WSN area.
f(bi|pa, σ22) is
f(bi|pa, σ22) =
[
(1− pa)N (0, σ21) + paN (0, σ22)
]
(4.4)
where N (0, σ21) is the Gaussian distribution with zero mean, and variance σ21 = 1,
which can be considered the case of no attack. N (0, σ22) is a Gaussian component
with zero mean, and σ22 variance which follows a uniform distribution as in (4.3)
Now, we can rewrite the pdf of the RGMM assumption as
f(bi, pa, σ
2
2) =
[
(1− pa)N (0, σ21) + paN (0, σ22)
]
f(pa)f(σ
2
2) (4.5)
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We can see that according to (4.5), we can find the bi pdf by integrating (4.5) over
pa and σ
2
2 respectively. The resulting f(bi) is therefore
f(bi) =
∫ ρ
σ21
∫ α
0
[
(1− pa) 1√2πσ1 e
− b
2
i
2σ21 + pa
1√
2πσ2
e
− b
2
i
2σ22
]
1
α
1
ρ− σ21
dpadσ
2
2 (4.6)
Solving the internal integration over pa we get
(1− α
2
)
1√
2πσ1
e
− b
2
i
2σ21 +
∫ ρ
σ21
[
α
2
1√
2πσ2
e
− b
2
i
2σ22
1
ρ−σ21
dσ22
]
(4.7)
Solving the integral in (4.7), we get the false information injected distribution f(bi) :
bi ∼
[(
1− α
2
)
N (0, σ21)
+
(α
2
) ( 1
ρ− σ21
)
 e− b
2
i
2ρ
√
π
√
1
2ρ
− e
− b
2
i
2σ21
√
π
√
1
2σ21

+
√
b2i
[
erf
(√
b2i√
2ρ
)
− erf
( √
b2i√
2σ21
)] (4.8)
Now we have derived the pdf of the assumed injected noise.
We will use the same signal collecting strategy as in [7], as shown in Fig. (2).
The amplitude ai at the ith sensor will be corrupted by a noise that follows RGM
Model, which can be considered as a false information injection or a general spoofing
attack by an unknown adversary. The signal received at each sensor can be modeled
by :
ri = ai + bi (4.9)
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where ri is the received corrupted signal at the ith sensor ,ai is the amplitude of the
uncorrupted target signal at ith sensor as given in (3.1), and bi is the attacker noise
that follows the distribution given in eq.(4.8).
Since, we have found the bi’s distribution, we are ready to derive the maximum
likelihood estimator (MLE) and the CRLB for the problem where pa and σ
2
2 are
random variables in the next section.
4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE)
In this section, we derive the maximum likelihood estimator for fault-tolerant
source location problem where pa and σ
2
2 are unknown random variables. We assume
that the MLE uses QRSS data as in Chapter 3. Where the same quantization process
as in (3.6)
Di =

0 −∞ ≤ ri < ηi1
1 ηi1 ≤ ri < ηi2
: :
: :
L− 1 ηL−1 ≤ ri <∞
(4.10)
where D = [D1, · · · , DN ]T is the vector of the quantized data generated by the
sensors, and Di could take any value in the Di ∈ {0, · · · , 2M − 1}, which is also
denoted by Di = l ∈ [0 L− 1], where L = 2M .
Now, we need to find the probability that Di takes a specific value of l according
toassumptions made earlier in this Chapter. It is possible to find pil(ηi, θ) by integrat-
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ing the pdf of bi over the interval [ξil ξil+1], where ξil = (ηil−ai) and ξil+1 = (ηil+1−ai)
respectively. For simplicity, we denote c1 = (1− α2 ), and c2 =
(
α
2
) (
1
ρ−σ21
)
.
∫ ξil+1
ξil
f(bi)dbi (4.11)
For simplicity, we divide the integration into five terms and we will calculate the
integration for each term with respect to bi.
1st term
∫ ξil+1
ξil
1√
2πσ1
e
− b
2
i
2σ21 dbi =
[
Q
(
ξil
σ1
)
−Q
(
ξil+1
σ1
)]
= λ0 (4.12)
2nd term
∫ ξil+1
ξil
 e− b2i2ρ√
π
√
1
2ρ
 dbi = 2ρ [Q( ξil√
ρ
)
−Q
(
ξil+1√
ρ
)]
= λ1 (4.13)
3rd term
∫ ξil+1
ξil
 e−
b2i
2σ21
√
π
√
1
2σ21
 dbi = 2σ21 [Q(ξilσ1
)
−Q
(
ξil+1
σ1
)]
= λ2 (4.14)
4th term∫ ξil+1
ξil
√
b2i erf
(√
b2i√
2ρ
)
dbi
=
 (ξ2il+1−ρ) erf( ξil+1√2ρ )
2
+
√
ρ ξil+1 e
−
ξ2il+1
2ρ
√
2π
− [ (ξ2il−ρ) erf( ξil√2ρ)
2
+
√
ρ ξil e
−
ξ2il
2ρ
√
2π
]
= λ3
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Similarly we can find the 5th term result as:
5th term
∫ ξil+1
ξil
√
b2i erf
( √
b2i√
2σ21
)
dbi =
 (ξ2il+1−σ21) erf
(
ξil+1√
2σ21
)
2
+ σ1 ξil+1 e
−
ξ2il+1
2σ21√
2π

−
 (ξ2il−σ21) erf
(
ξil√
2σ21
)
2
+ σ1 ξil e
−
ξ2il
2σ21√
2π
 = λ4
Then, the probability pil(ηi, θ) is
pil(ηi, θ) = c1 [λ0] + c2 [(λ1 − λ2) + (λ3 − λ4)] (4.15)
Now the joint probability of the sensor data can be found as follows
p (D|θ) =
N∏
i=1
L−1∏
l=0
pil(ηi,θ)
δ(Di−l) (4.16)
where δ(.) is the Kronecker delta function. The log-likelihood function for the
sensor data is
log p(D|θ) =
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l) log pil(ηi,θ) (4.17)
Our object is to find the value of θ that maximizes the log-likelihood function.
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So the ML estimator is
θ̂ = arg max
θ
log p(D|θ) (4.18)
After we find the MLE for the source location, we can find the CRLB for the
proposed estimator.
4.3 Cramer Rao Lower Bound (CRLB)
In this section we derive the CRLB for the proposed MLE for source location
estimation for performance evaluation.
Theorem 2 : For an unbiased estimator θ̂(D), the CRLB is given by
E
{
[θ̂(D)− θ][θ̂(D)− θ]T
}
≥ J−1 (4.19)
where J is the 3× 3 Fisher information matrix (FIM).
Proof:
The following is the proof of Theorem 2, which provides the FIM for the local-
ization problem subjected to the false information injection attacks, where the attack
probability and noise variance follow certain uniform distribution.
J = −E[∇θ∇Tθ log p(D|θ)] (4.20)
where ∇θ is the gradient vector:
∇θ =
[
∂
∂P0
∂
∂xt
∂
∂yt
]T
(4.21)
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The Fisher information matrix J can be described as
J = −E[∇θ∇Tθ log p(D|θ)] = −E

∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂P0
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂x2t
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂yt∂P0
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂yt∂xt
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
 =

j11 j12 j13
j21 j22 j23
j31 j32 j33

(4.22)
From (2.9) we have the log - likelihood function as
log p(D|θ) =
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l) log pil(ηi,θ) (4.23)
Then, each element of the above matrix can be calculated as follows ,
the 1st derivative of the log likelihood function with respect to P0 is
∂ log p(D|θ)
∂P0
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]
(4.24)
and the 2nd derivative is
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
(4.25)
Next, we calculate the (1,1) element of J.
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
p2il(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂2pil(ηi,θ)
∂P 20
]
(4.26)
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and
j11 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]2
(4.27)
by using the identity E[δ(Di − l)] = pil(ηi,θ). Since
pil(ηi, θ) = c1[λ0] + c2[(λ1 − λ2) + (λ3 − λ4)] (4.28)
.
we have
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
= c1[
∂λ0
∂P0
] + c2[(
∂λ1
∂P0
− ∂λ2
∂P0
) + (
∂λ3
∂P0
− ∂λ4
∂P0
)] (4.29)
Then
∂λ0
∂P0
=
[
γil
2
√
2πaidni σ1
]
=
kil0
2aidni
(4.30)
∂λ1
∂P0
=
√
2
√
ρ φil
2
√
πaidni
=
kil1
2aidni
(4.31)
∂λ2
∂P0
=
√
2 σ1 γil
2
√
πaidni
=
kil2
2aidni
(4.32)
∂λ3
∂P0
=
kil3
2aidni
(4.33)
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∂λ4
∂P0
=
kil4
2aidni
(4.34)
where
kil0 =
[
γil√
2πσ1
]
(4.35)
kil1 =
√
2
√
ρ
√
π
[φil] (4.36)
kil2 =
√
2σ1√
π
[γil] (4.37)
kil3 =
[
ξil+1 erf
(
ξil+1√
2ρ
)
− ξil erf
(
ξil√
2ρ
)]
(4.38)
kil4 =
[
ξil+1 erf
(
ξil+1√
2σ21
)
− ξil erf
(
ξil√
2σ21
)]
(4.39)
and
γil =
[
e
−
(
ξ2il
2σ21
)
− e
−
(
ξ2il+1
2σ21
)]
(4.40)
φil =
[
e
−
(
ξ2il
2ρ
)
− e
−
(
ξ2il+1
2ρ
)]
(4.41)
Then
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[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
]
=
[
[ c1
2
[kil0] +
c2
2
[(kil1 − kil2) + (kil3 − kil4)]]
aidni
]
(4.42)
Similarly we can find ∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
as
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
= c1
[
∂λ0
∂xt
]
+ c2
[(
∂λ1
∂xt
− ∂λ2
∂xt
)
+
(
∂λ3
∂xt
− ∂λ4
∂xt
)]
(4.43)
Then
∂λ0
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
[
γil
2
√
2πσ1
]
(xi − xt) = naid−2i
kil0
2
(xi − xt) (4.44)
∂λ1
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
√
2
√
ρ φil
2
√
π
(xi − xt) = naid−2i
kil1
2
(xi − xt) (4.45)
∂λ2
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
√
2 σ1 γil
2
√
π
(xi − xt) = naid−2i
kil2
2
(xi − xt) (4.46)
∂λ3
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
kil3
2
(xi − xt) (4.47)
∂λ4
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
kil4
2
(xi − xt) (4.48)
58
Then,[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
= naid
−2
i
(c1
2
(kil0) +
c2
2
((kil1 − kil2) + (kil3 − kil4))
)
(xi − xt) (4.49)
Now, we can find ∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
as
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
= c1
[
∂λ0
∂yt
]
+ c2
[(
∂λ1
∂yt
− ∂λ2
∂yt
)
+
(
∂λ3
∂yt
− ∂λ4
∂yt
)]
(4.50)
Where
∂λ0
∂xt
= naid
−2
i
[
γil
2
√
2πσ1
]
(yi − yt) = naid−2i
kil0
2
(yi − yt) (4.51)
∂λ1
∂yt
= naid
−2
i
√
2
√
ρ φil
2
√
π
(yi − yt) = naid−2i
kil1
2
(yi − yt) (4.52)
∂λ2
∂yt
= naid
−2
i
√
2 σ1 γil
2
√
π
(yi − yt) = naid−2i
kil2
2
(yi − yt) (4.53)
∂λ3
∂yt
= naid
−2
i
kil3
2
(yi − yt) (4.54)
∂λ4
∂yt
= naid
−2
i
kil4
2
(yi − yt) (4.55)
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Then,[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
= naid
−2
i
(c1
2
(kil0) +
c2
2
((kil1 − kil2) + (kil3 − kil4))
)
(yi − yt) (4.56)
Now we can return to calculate the J matrix elements,
By substituting (4.42) in (4.27), we get
j11 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
=
N∑
i=1
Ωia
−2
i d
−2n
i (4.57)
where
Ωi =
L−1∑
l=0
[
c1
2
[kil0] +
c2
2
[(kil1 − kil2) + (kil3 − kil4)]
]2
pil(ηi, θ)
(4.58)
Similarly, we can find the j12 which is equal to j21 elements since the FIM matrix is
symmetric
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
]
(4.59)
j12 = j21 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂xt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
]
(4.60)
substituting (4.42) and (4.49) in (4.60), we get
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j12 = j21 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P 20
]
= n
∑
i
Ωid
−(n+2)
i (xi − xt) (4.61)
Next, the j22 element of the FIM matrix can be found as
j22 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂x2t
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂pil(ηi, θ)
∂xt
]2
(4.62)
substituting (4.49) and (4.62), we get
j22 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)2 (4.63)
Next, we calculate j13 = j31 elements
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
]
(4.64)
Substituting (4.42) and (4.56) in (4.64), then j13 = j31 as:
j13 = j31 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂P0∂yt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂P0
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
(4.65)
Then,
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j13 = j31 = n
∑
i
Ωid
−(n+2)
i (yi − yt) (4.66)
Now, calculating the elements j23 = j32:
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
]
(4.67)
then j23 = j32
j23 = j32 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂xt∂yt
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂xt
] [
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]
(4.68)
Thus, j13 = j31 elements
j23 = j32 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)(yi − yt) (4.69)
Finally, we calculate the j33 element
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
−δ(Di − l)
[pil(ηi,θ)]2
[
∂pil(ηi,θ)
∂yt
]2
+
δ(Di − l)
pil(ηi,θ)
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
]
(4.70)
Then j33 :
j33 = −E
[
∂2 log p(D|θ)
∂y2t
]
=
N∑
i=1
L−1∑
l=0
1
pil(ηi, θ)
[
∂pil(ηi, θ)
∂yt
]2
(4.71)
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Thus,
j33 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (yi − yt)2 (4.72)
In summary, we have the CRLB for the above MLE as follows :
j11 =
∑
i
Ωid
−2n
i a
−2
i
j12 = j21 = n
∑
i
Ωid
−(n+2)
i (xi − xt)
j13 = j31 = n
∑
i
Ωid
−(n+2)
i (yi − yt)
j22 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)2
j23 = j32 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (xi − xt)(yi − yt)
j33 = n
2
∑
i
Ωia
2
i d
−4
i (yi − yt)2 (4.73)
then the FIM matrix can be written as:
J =

j11 j12 j13
j21 j22 j23
j31 j32 j33
 (4.74)
Then, the CRLB can be easily calculated by finding the inverse of J.
Now, we have derived the closed-from MLE and the CRLB for the false informa-
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tion injection attacks, where the asttack probability and noise variance follow certain
uniform distribution.
In the next section, we will present and discuss the simulation results for the
proposed estimator.
4.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present and discuss the simulation results for the pro-
posed source location estimation based on the MLE. Here, we also use a grid search
algorithm to find the intial esitmate, then we use the MATLAB nonlinear optimiza-
tion function fmincon to find the estimate θ̂ = [P̂0 x̂t ŷt]. We also assume a sensor
deployed uniformly in the ROI, the threshold set is set as ηi = [1, 2, 3], and the
state vector of the true parameters is [25000 2 2]. The injected noise attack proba-
bility and injected noise variance follow uniform distributions. So pa ∼ U(0, α) and
σ22 ∼ U(σ21, ρ). Our simulations are based on 1500 Monte-Carlo runs with the sensor
square root number ranging from 8 to 20. The quantization used here is also the
quaternary quantization with M = 2 and the attenuation parameter is set as n = 2.
We use the root mean square error (RMSE) as a metric for performance evaluation.
The ROI area is 200× 200 m2.
In Fig.6, the performance of the proposed estimator is compared to the nominal
MLE from [6], which was developed for the case of no attack, and the corresponding
CRLB derived in the previous section. We can see that the proposed MLE provides a
better performance under the assumption of an attack probability pa ∼ U(0, α = 0.03)
and σ22 ∼ U(σ21, ρ = 100), than the MLE in [6] which is not aware of possible attacks,
and the simulation results show that the estimator is able to converge to the CRLB
in all the cases even with a relatively small number of sensors.
64
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Square Root of Sensors number
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
R
M
S
E
 o
f 
p
o
w
e
r 
in
 W
a
tt
 RMSE for power 
nominal MLE
RGMM  = 0.03,  = 100
CRLB
(a)
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Square Root of Sensors number
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
R
M
S
E
 o
f 
x
t 
in
 m
 RMSE for x
t
 
nominal MLE
RGMM  = 0.03,  = 100
CRLB
(b)
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Square Root of Sensors number
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
R
M
S
E
 o
f 
y
t 
in
 m
 RMSE for y
t
 
nominal MLE
RGMM  = 0.03,  = 100
CRLB
(c)
Fig. 6. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors α = 0.03
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In Fig.7, we increase the upper limit for the attack probability to be pa ∼
U(0, α = 0.3), and we notice from the simulation results that the proposed MLE
performance is robust and can approach the CRLB as the number of sensors in-
creases, and it outperforms the nominal MLE which is unaware of the attacks and
provides a very poor performance with the increased attack probability pa.
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Fig. 7. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors α = 0.3
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In Fig.8 and Fig.9, we illustrate the RMSEs of different MLE algorithms includ-
ing the nominal MLE, MLE-QRSS-GMM, and MLE-QRSS-RGMM algorithms. The
sensor data have been generated according to RGMM model. We can notice from
Fig.8 that at small value of pa the RGMM’s performance is slightly better than the
GMM’s performance, and both algorithms outperform the nominal MLE. In Fig.9,
when pa for the MLE-QRSS-GMM incresed into pa = 0.3 and the α for the MLE-
QRSS-RGMM is also increased into α = 0.3, we notice that the MLE - QRSS - RGMM
has a much better performance, then the MLE - QRSS - GMM which provides an
acceptable performance it will still give better results than the nominal case.
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Fig. 8. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors pa = 0.03, α = 0.03.
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Fig. 9. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors pa = 0.3, α = 0.3.
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We also make an assumption of a mismatch between the measurements and the
algorithm design parameters to evaluate the algorithm’s robustness. The simulation
parameters are set as pa = 0.1, and σ
2
2 = 100 for the original data generation. We
have designed algoritms with the follwing parameters, for the 1st algorithm, an MLE-
QRSS-GMM, pa = 0.1 and σ
2
2 = 100. This algorithm is considered as the matched
algorithm. The other two algorithms are MLE-QRSS-GMM algorithms with pa = 0.3
and pa = 0.5 respectively, and σ
2
2 = 100 for both of them. The 4th algorithm
is designed according to the MLE-QRSS-RGMM assumption with pa ∼ U(0, 0.1),
and σ22 ∼ U(σ21, 100). The CRLB here is calculated for the MLE-QRSS-GMM with
matched parameters. In Fig.10, the simulation results are shown for the mismatched
situation. We can notice that the MLE-QRSS-RGMM performance is almost identical
to the MLE-QRSS-GMM with the parameters pa = 0.1 and σ
2
2 = 100, while the MLE-
QRSS-GMM algorithms with pa = 0.3 and pa = 0.5 give poor performances. It is
obvious that the MLE - QRSS -RGMM algorithm is giving a very robust performance
under the mismatch situation.
In Fig.11, the simulation parameters are set as pa = 0.2, and σ
2
2 = 100 for the
original data generation. Here, we have also designed four algoritms with the follwing
parameters, for the 1st algorithm, an MLE-QRSS-GMM, pa = 0.2 and σ
2
2 = 100, and
this algorithm is considered as the matched algorithm. The other two algorithms are
MLE-QRSS-GMM algorithms with pa = 0.3 and pa = 0.5 respectively, and σ
2
2 = 200
for both of them. The 4th algorithm is designed according to the MLE-QRSS-RGMM
assumption with pa ∼ U(0, 0.4), and σ22 ∼ U(σ21, 200). We can see that even without
the knowledge of pa and σ
2
2, the MLE-QRSS-RGMM algorithm will still give an
excellent performance and it coincides with the matched algorithm performance. On
the other hand, the other mismatched algorithms with pa = 0.3 and pa = 0.5, provide
poor performances in this case.
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In summary, the proposed MLE-QRSS-RGMM algorithm provides a very robust
performance for the cases where pa and σ
2
2 are unknown, and only their ranges are
known.
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Fig. 10. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors for MisMatched assumption.
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Fig. 11. The RMSE vs. square root of number of sensors for MisMatched assumption.
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CHAPTER 5
MINIMAX BAYESIAN ESTIMATOR UNDER FALSE
INFORMATION INJECTION ATTACKS
In this Chapter, we investigate the problem of false information injection attack on
the linear Bayesian estimator. We formulated the relationship between the attacker
and the defender as a minimax optimization problem. The attacker tries to maximize
the cost function by controlling the attack power. On the other hand, the defender
tries to minimize the attack effect by optimizing the detection threshold selection. we
develop numerical solution for the minimax problem.
5.1 Mathematical Model
Assume that we have N sensors . The general linear and Gaussian system mea-
surements can be modeled as
zi = H ix+ wi, i = 1, ..., N (5.1)
where H i is the measurement matrix, wi ∼ N (0, σ2w), and x is the state vector.
Assume that wi
′s are i.i.d across the sensors, and bi is an injected sensor bias by an
adversary, then
z′i = Hix+ wi + bi = zi + bi (5.2)
where z′i is the corrupted sensor measurement, bi is the injected false information
which can be a deterministic or random bias.
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Let z = [z1, ...., zN ]
T is the total sensor measurement vector, b = [b1, ..., bN ]
T
is the vector includes the injected noise at all the sensors. Similarly let H =
[HT1 , ...,H
T
N ]
T be the matrix measurement, and w = [w1, ..., wN ]
T be the measure-
ment noise vector. Then (5.1) and (5.2) can be written as
z = Hx+w
z′ = z + b
(5.3)
Let P ww = E[ww
T ] be the covariance matrix of the measurements error. Next, we
will formulate the relationship between the attacker an the defender as a minimax
optimization problem for Bayesian estimator under false information attacks.
5.2 False Information Injection with Deterministic Bias
5.2.1 Mathematical Model
In this section we assume the attacker attacks with a constant deterministic bias
b, the two hypotheses can be modeled as
H0 : z = Hx+w
H1 : z
′ = Hx+w + b
Under H0 hypothesis where no attack exists we have :
z = H x+w (5.4)
where H is the known measurement matrix, x ∼ N (x,P xx) is the state vector, P xx
and P ww are covariance matrices for x and w.
Then, we assume that the system is using a Chi-square detector to detect the cor-
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rupted measurement. The Chi square detector uses the following test statistic
t = (z − z)TS−1(z − z) (5.5)
where z = Hx is the measurement mean, and S = P zz,H0 , is the covariance matrix
for measurement z under H0 :
P zz,H0 = S = E[(z − z)(z − z)T ] = HP xxHT + P ww (5.6)
Now, the probability of false alarm can be derived as
Pr(D1|H0) = Pr(t ≥ ψ|H0) = 1− χ2nz(ψ) (5.7)
where χ2nz is the CDF of a Chi square distributed random variable with nz degrees of
freedom, and ψ is the threshold for the detector.
Pr(D0|H0) = Pr(t < ψ|H0) = 1− Pr(D1|H0) = χ2nz(ψ) (5.8)
Now, we have derived the probability of false alarm under H0 hypothesis, where D1
is the detector decision that there is an attack, and D0 is the decision that there is
no attack.
Under H1 we have :
z′ = H x+w + b (5.9)
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where b, is a deterministic injected bias.
We need to find the probabilities of detection and miss under H1 hypothesis.
Assume γ ∼ N (0,P zz), where γ = (z − z), and P zz = E[(z − z̄)(z − z̄)T ] =
HP xxH
T + P ww. Then a new parameter can be defined as γ
′ = (γ + b). Let
t = γ′
T
S−1γ ′ = γ′
T
P−1zz γ
′ (5.10)
where γ ′ ∼ N (b,P zz), (5.10) can also be written as
t = (γ + b)TP−1zz (γ + b) (5.11)
Since P−1zz can be decomposed as P
−1
zz = P
− 1
2
zz P
− 1
2
zz , (5.11) can be rewritten as
t = (γ + b)TP
− 1
2
zz P
− 1
2
zz (γ + b) (5.12)
Therefore, we have
t = (P
− 1
2
zz (γ + b))
T (P
− 1
2
zz (γ + b)) (5.13)
which can be also written as
t = (P
− 1
2
zz γ
′)T (P
− 1
2
zz γ
′) (5.14)
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Now, a new parameter can be defined as ω = P
− 1
2
zz γ ′ = P
− 1
2
zz (γ+b). Then (5.14) can
also be described as
t = ωTω (5.15)
Therefore, the mean and the covariance of the parameter ω can be calculated as
E[ω] = P
− 1
2
zz b = ω (5.16)
and
E[(ω − P−
1
2
zz b)(ω − P
− 1
2
zz b)
T ] = E[P
− 1
2
zz γγ
TP
− 1
2
zz ] = I (5.17)
where the fact that E[γγT ] = P zz has been used. Let r = P
− 1
2
zz b, where P
− 1
2
zz is a
nz × nz and b is a nz × 1 vector.
Now we have
ω ∼ N (r, I) (5.18)
where I is the nz × nz identity matrix. So we have
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
ω1 ∼ N (r1, 1)
ω2 ∼ N (r2, 1)
.
.
.
ωN ∼ N (rN , 1)

(5.19)
Since
t = (ω)T (ω) =
N∑
i=1
ω2i (5.20)
it can be shown that, t follows a Non-Central Chi squared distribution with nz degrees
of freedom, with non-centrality parameter [33, 34]
λ =
N∑
i=1
r2i = ||r||
2 (5.21)
where λ is the non centrality parameter. Hence, the probability of detection can be
written as
P (D1|H1) = Pr(t ≥ ψ) = Q k
2
(
√
λ,
√
ψ) (5.22)
where k is the degrees of freedom which is in our assumption nz, and QM(a, b) is the
Marcum Q-function [34]
80
QM(a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
x
(x
a
)M−1
e−
x2+a2
2 IM−1(ax) dx (5.23)
where IM−1(.) is the modified Bessel function of order M−1. Note that the probability
of miss is simply
P (D0|H1) = 1− P (D1|H1) (5.24)
Now, we have found the probability of detection P (D1|H1), and miss detection prob-
ability P (D0|H1), where D1 is the detector decision that there is an attack, and D0
is the decision that there is no attack.
We adopt the detection and discard strategy of [13], which was shown as a robust
strategy in [13]. This can be explained in the following table
Scenarios The response
1- if D1|H1 Correct detection Discard the sensors’ data
2- if D0|H1 Miss detection - Mismatch Use the sensors’ data
3- if D1|H0 – False alarm Discard the sensors’ data
4- if D0|H0 No false alarm Use the sensors’ data
where in D1|H1 is the case when the detector indicates an attack. In this case the
response for the detector will be to discard all the received corrupted measurements
and the cost will be determined by the prior information P xx. In the D0|H1 scenario,
the detector will indicate that there is no attack and it will incorporate the corrupted
data in the system, and the cost function in this scenario will be a combination of
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the prior information and the corrupted data.
In D1|H0, the detector will indicate an attack under H0 hypothesis, which is the
no attack hypothesis. The response for this scenario will be discarding the measure-
ment and keep only the prior information, and the cost function will be determined
by the prior information P xx. In D0|H0, the detector will indicate that there is no at-
tack under H0 hypothesis. In this case, the cost will be determined by the traditional
MMSE. the average cost function has been provided by [13] as
c = [P (H1)P (D1|H1) c1
+P (H1)P (D0|H1) c2
+P (H0)P (D1|H0) c3
+P (H0)P (D0|H0) c4]
(5.25)
where ci as i ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4] are the traces of the mean squared error matrices, P (Di|Hj)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1} are the detection, miss detection, false alarm, and no false alarm
probabilities. P (H0) and P (H1) are the prior probabilities of attack and no attack,
respectively.
The cost elements have been derived in [13] as :
c1 = c3 = Tr[P xx] (5.26)
and
c4 = Tr[P xx − P xz,H0P−1zz,H0P zx,H0 ] (5.27)
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where c4 is the trace of the conditional covariance of the MMSE estimator given by
(2.15) in Chapter 2 .
In [13], the injected bias was assumed to be a random Gaussian vector. In
contrast to [13], we assume the injected noise b to be a deterministic vector. So we
derive c2 in the cost function as follows. First we have
x̂ = x̄+ P xzP
−1
zz,H0
(z − z̄ + b) (5.28)
where x̂ is the Bayesian MMSE estimator, and P xz,H0 = P
T
zx,H0
= P xxH
T . Let
x̃ = (x− x̄) and z̃ = (z − z̄), then
(x− x̂) = (x̃− P xzP−1zz,H0 z̃ − P xzP
−1
zz,H0
b) (5.29)
Now E[(x− x̂)(x− x̂)T ]
E[(x−x̂)(x−x̂)T ] = E[(x̃−P xzP−1zz,H0 z̃−P xzP
−1
zz,H0
b)(x̃T−z̃TP−1zz,H0P zx−b
TP−1zz,H0P zx)]
(5.30)
Thus
E[(x− x̂)(x− x̂)T ] = P xx − P xz,H0P−1zz,H0(I − [bb
T ]P−1zz,H0)P zx
(5.31)
where the fact that E[x̃x̃T ] = P xx, E[z̃z̃
T ] = P zz,H0 , and E[bb
T ] = bbT has been
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used,thus under the mismatch case the cost can be calculated as the trace of (5.31)
as :
c2 = Tr[P xx − P xz,H0P−1zz,H0(I − [bb
T ]P−1zz,H0)P zx] (5.32)
Since P (D1|H1),P (D0|H1), P (D1|H1), and P (D0|H0) are functions of ψ, the cost
function defined in (5.25) is a function of both ψ and the attacker injected bias b.
So we have formulated the relationship between the detector threshold ψ and the
attacker injected bias b as a minimax optimization problem as follows
arg min
ψ
max
bbT
[P (H1)P (D1|H1) c1
+P (H1)P (D0|H1) c2
+P (H0)P (D1|H0) c3
+P (H0)P (D0|H0) c4]
s.t. bTb = a2
(5.33)
where the attacker is trying to maximize the attack effect by changing bbT , while
the defender is trying to minimize the attack effect by changing ψ, where bTb is the
attack power, which is under constraint a2. Next, some numerical results for this
minimax problem are shown.
5.2.2 Numerical Results for Deterministic False Information Injection
In this section, we present the numerical results for the attack with a determin-
istic bias on the Bayesian estimator. The attacker bias will be a deterministic vector
b = [b1 b2]
T , and the false information power is b21 + b
2
2 = a
2, where a2 ∈ [0, 500]. Let
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us assume that b21 = κa
2, and κ is a power allocation parameter. The attack matrix
bbT can be written as
bbT =
 κa2 υ√κ(1− κ)a2
υ
√
κ(1− κ)a2 (1− κ)a2
 (5.34)
where υ ∈ {−1, 1}, the prior information will be x ∼ N (x,P xx) , with x = [5 10]T ,
and P xx =
50 0
0 50
. w ∼ N (0,P ww) is the Gaussian noise with P ww =
2 0
0 4

and w = [0 0]T (the mean of the measurements noise is zero). H is the measurements
matrix which is a 2 × 2 identity matrix. The prior probability of attack p1 and no
attack p0 are set as p1 = p0 = 0.5.
The cost function of (5.25) and the probabilities of detection and miss detection
given in (5.22) and (5.24) are calculated using non-Central Chi squared assumption.
The probabilities of false alarm is calculated by (5.7). The cost function elements
[c1, c2, c3, c4] are calculated according to the equations (5.26), (5.27), and (5.32). The
detection threshold ψ will be in the range of ψ ∈ [0, 30].
We have used grid search algorithm to find the combination of (κ, υ) that maxi-
mizes the cost function for multiple combinations of (ψ, (bTb) = a2) values. It always
holds that choosing κ = 1, or the total power being allocated to the first state ele-
ment, will achieve maximum cost for the multiple combinations of thresholds ψ and
(bTb = a2). So, in our numerical results we will always set the value of κ = 1. When
κ = 1, the value of υ will not affect the cost function since the total power will be
assigned to the first element of matrix bbT . Therefore, we will always set the value
of υ = 1 in our numerical results.
In Fig.12, the cost function versus the attacker power a2 and the detection thresh-
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old ψ is shown. We can notice that, when the threshold value is ψ = 0, the cost
function will be equal to c = 100, which is a reasonable outcome since when ψ = 0,
both probabilities of detection and false alarm will be one, and the cost function will
be combination of c1, and c3 which is Tr[P xx]. When ψ value increases, we notice
three behaviours from the figure with respect to the attacker power based on Fig.12.
First, when the attacker power is low, i.e lower than or equal to 100, then the cost
function will decrease with the increase in the detector threshold. This means that
when the injected bias is weak, then incorporating the observed sensors’ measure-
ments will reduce the estimation error and improve the over all system performance
under low power injected bias. When the attacker power is in between 100 to 300 then
the cost function will have an interesting result which is a decrease in the range from
0 to some value of threshold lower than 5, and then it starts increasing, that means
incorporating the observed sensors’ measurements to a certain limit will improve the
system performance and after that threshold the performance will be degraded by
incorporating the sensors’ data.
The third region is when the attacker power is greater than 300 then the cost
function will start at 100 and it will be increasing with the increase of the threshold,
that means that when the injected bias power is greater than 300, then it is better
for the detector to discard the sensors’ data. It could be also noted that for a high
value of threshold then the cost function will be increasing linearly with the increase
in the attacker power. This is because when the injected bias is strong, it is better
to discard the corrupted sensor data.
In Fig.13, the three regions of the cost function are illustrated, where we notice
that at first sub-figure, the cost function will keep decreasing with increasing the
threshold when a2 is small. In the second sub-figure, we notice the decrements in
the cost function for the range of threshold between 0 and some value lower than 5,
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and it will start increasing afte that. The third sub-figure shows the case when the
attacker power is large enough then the cost function will keep increasing with the
increase of the detection threshold.
Fig. 12. The Cost function for attack with deterministic bias.
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Fig. 13. The cost function for deterministic bias vs. detection threshold ψ, attacker
power a2 = 50, 200, 500.
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5.3 False Information Injection with Random Bias
5.3.1 Mathematical Model
Assume the attacker is attacking with a random bias b that has a Gaussian
distribution b ∼ N (b̄,P bb), where b̄ and P bb are the mean and the covariance matrix
for the injected bias respectively.
Under H0, which is the no attack hypothesis, the probabilities of false alarm
and its complement can be calculated as in (5.7) and (5.8), based on a Chi square
distribution with nz degrees of freedom.
Under H1 hypothesis, where the sensor measurements will be corrupted by in-
jected bias b as
z = H x+w + b (5.35)
Hence, the probability of detection can be calculated as
P (D1|H1) =
∫
b2
∫
b1
Pd(b)Pb(b)db1db2 (5.36)
according to the non-central Chi squared distribution then Pd(b) can be described as
Pd(b) = Q k
2
(
√
λ,
√
ψ) (5.37)
whereQM(a, b) is the Marcum function withM degrees of freedom [34], λ = ||P
− 1
2
zz b||2,
and b ∼ N (0,Pbb) with
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Pb(b) = |2πP bb|−
1
2 e−
1
2
bTP−1bb b (5.38)
Therefore, the probability of detection can be calculated as
P (D1|H1) =
∫
b2
∫
b1
Q k
2
(
√
λ,
√
ψ) |2πP bb|−
1
2 e−
1
2
bTP−1bb bdb1db2 (5.39)
and the probability of miss is
P (D0|H1) = 1− P (D1|H1) (5.40)
Solving the above integrals numerically we get the P (D1|H1) and P (D0|H1).
Now, cost function parameters of [c1, c2, c3] can be calculated as given in (5.26)
and (5.27), and under the mismatch case the cost has been derived in [4] as the
c2 = Tr(E[(x̂− x)(x̂− x)T ]) which is
c2 = Tr[P xx − P xz,H0P−1zz,H0P zx,H0 + P xz,H0P
−1
zz,H0
P bbP
−1
zz,H0
P zx,H0 ]
= Tr[P xx − P xz,H0P−1zz,H0(I − P bbP
−1
zz,H0
)P zx,H0 ]
(5.41)
where P xz,H0 = P
T
zx,H0
= P xxH
T .
Now, we have found all the terms of the cost function. The attack probability is
assumed to be known and it is set as P (H0) = p0 = 0.5 and P (H1) = p1 = 0.5.
Next, the relationship between the attacker and the defender can be formulated
as a minimax optimization problem over C(ψ,P bb), as
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arg min
ψ
max
Pbb
[P (H1)P (D1|H1) c1
+P (H1)P (D0|H1) c2
+P (H0)P (D1|H0) c3
+P (H0)P (D0|H0) c4]
s.t. T r[P bb] = a
2
(5.42)
where the attacker is trying to maximize the attack effect by changing P bb, while the
defender is trying to minimize the attack effect by changing ψ. Here, the detection
and discard strategy will be used as in the deterministic case, where the defender will
discard the sensors’ data under D1|H1 and D1|H0 as explained earlier. Next, some
numerical results for this minimax problem will be presented.
5.3.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we present the numerical results for the attack with a random
bias on the Bayesian estimator. The attacker bias will be a random Gaussian vector
b ∼ N (b,P bb), where b = [0 0]T and P bb =
 σ21b ρσ1bσ2b
ρσ1bσ2b σ
2
2b
, ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and the
false information power is σ21b + σ
2
2b = a
2, where a2 ∈ [0, 500], σ21b = κa2, and κ is the
power allocation parameter.
The prior information will be x ∼ N (x,P xx) , with x = [5 10]T , and P xx =50 0
0 50
 . w ∼ N (0,P ww) is the Gaussian noise with P ww =
2 0
0 4
 and w =
[0 0]T , and H is the measurements matrix which is a 2×2 identity matrix. The prior
probabilities of attack p1 and no attack p0 are set as p1 = p0 = 0.5.
The cost function of (5.42) and the probabilities of detection and miss detection
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given in (5.39) and (5.40) are calculated using numerical integration function in Mat-
lab. The probabilities of false alarm is calculated by (5.7). The cost function elements
[c1, c2, c3, c4] are calculated according to (5.26), (5.27), and (5.41).
We have used grid search algorithm to investigate the combination of (κ, ρ) that
maximizes the cost function for multiple combinations of (ψ, Tr(P bb) = a
2) values.
It always holds that choosing κ = 1, or equivalently the total power being allocated
to the first state element, will achieve maximum cost for the multiple combinations
of thresholds ψ and (Tr(P bb) = a
2). So, in our numerical results we will always set
the value of κ = 1. κ = 1 means that the value of ρ will not affect the cost function,
since the total power will be allocated to the first element of P bb matrix. Therefore,
we will always set the ρ = 1 in our numerical results.
In Fig.14, the cost function is plotted as a function of the detection threshold
ψ = [0 : 1 : 30] and the attacker power a2 = [0 : 50 : 500], with the power allocation
parameter κ = 1 that means σ2b1 = a
2, and the correlation coefficient is set as ρ = 1.
It is clear from Fig.14 that there are three regions in which the cost function changes
differently. The first region is when the power a2 ∈ [0, 100] in this region the cost will
decrease with increasing ψ until it reaches to its minimum value when ψ = 30. This
means when the power of the injected bias is low, it is better for the defender to use
the sensors’ measurements.
The second region lies in the range of a2 = [150, 300] , in this region the cost
function will decrease at the beginning in the range of ψ from 0 to a value lower
than 5. Then when ψ goes beyond 5 the cost function will increase until it reaches
its maximum when ψ = 30. Here, incorporating the sensors’ measurements below
certain threshold will improve the estimation performance.
The third region lies in the range of a2 = [350, 500], in this region the cost
function will increase with the increase of the value of the threshold until it reaches
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its maximum when ψ = 30. In this case the cost function will reach its maximum
value. In this case, the best strategy for the defender is to reject the sensors’ data
and only use the prior information available for the state vector.
Also, we can note from Fig.14, that the cost function will increase with the
increase of attacker power when the value of threshold greater than 10.
In Fig.15 a, b, and c, we plot the three regions of the cost function with respect
to detection threshold ψ and the values of a2 = 50, 200, and 500 respectively. In
Fig.15, it is clear that the cost function will be increasing in general with respect to
the increase in the attacker power, and there are some regions in which the increase
in cost function will be controlled by the detection threshold when a2 ∈ [0, 300], and
when a2 crosses the value of 300 then the cost function will keep increasing with the
increase of attacker power.
We can notice from the numerical results that the best strategy for the attacker
is to attack with a highest power available a2 since increasing the attack power will
generally increase the cost function. From the defender’s perspective, if there is
information about the attacker power, then the best strategy for the defender is to
select the optimal threshold to minimze the attacker effect. But if the defender has
no information about the attacker power then the best solution for the detector is to
discard the corrupted data, and use only the prior information.
5.4 The Solution for the Minimax Problem
In this section, we solve the minimax optimization problems in (5.33) and (5.42).
By solving these problems, we will know what the optimal strategy is for the defender
when it is under the worst false information injection attack, if it has a knowledge
about the attacker power a2. On the other hand, we will know which the best strategy
is for the attacker to use if it has knowledge about the defender detection threshold.
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Fig. 14. The Cost function for attack with random bias INT.
Here, we denote to the numerical integration approach as INT . Tables 5.1 and 5.2
show the numerical results for the solutions of minimax problems in (5.33) and (5.42)
for different values of attacker power a2 versus the defender’s detection threshold ψ.
In these tables, we have assumed that the attacker knows the threshold ψ, and it
attacks with the worst possible strategy by setting κ = 1, meaning that it allocates
all the power to the first state element.
In Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the results of the attack strategy with the deterministic
and random bias b are shown by solving (5.33) and (5.42), respectively. The attacker
power is determined by a2, which is bTb = a2 for the deterministic case and Tr[P bb] =
a2 for the random case. Then we maximize the cost function in (5.33) and (5.42) with
respect to a2 instead of bbT and P bb matrices, where a
2 ∈ [0 : 50 : 500]. On the other
hand, for the defender and based on the discussion done for Fig.12 and Fig.14, we
have selected four values of the thresholds ψ = {0, 2, 3, 30}, which have been shown
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to achieve the minimum cost function results with respect to a2.
Table 5.1. The solution to the minimax problem with deterministic bias, (bT b) = a2
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Table 5.2. The solution to the minimax problem with for random bias, Tr(P bb) = a
2
If the defender has knowledge of the attacker power, and the attacker power is
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 100, the optimum threshold for the detector will be ψ = 30, which will
achieve the minimum cost value. Next, if the attacker power is 150 ≤ a2 ≤ 200, the
optimal threshold for the defender will be ψ = 3, that will minimize the worst cost
function. We can also notice that when the attacker power is 250 ≤ a2 ≤ 300, the
optimum threshold will be ψ = 2. Finally, if the attacker power is 350 ≤ a2 ≤ 500, the
optimal threshold for the defender will be ψ = 0, which means that the to minimize
the cost function the defender needs to reject the corrupted sensor measurements.
On the other hand, if the defender has no knowledge of the attacker power, then the
optimum threshold for the defender will be ψ = 0, regardless of the attack power a2
that the attacker uses.
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Fig. 15. The cost function for random bias vs. detection threshold ψ, attacker power
a2 = 50, 200, 500.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we have investigated the problem of secure localization under a
false information injection attack. We have considered the localization system based
on quantized received signal strength. We have proposed two estimators based on the
QRSS data in WSNs. The first estimator is a maximum likelihood estimator based
on QRSS in which we have addressed the problem of false information injection using
a Gaussian mixture model. We have derived the maximum likelihood estimator and
its corresponding CRLB. Simulation results show that the prposed estimator is able
to outperform the nominal MLE, which is unaware of the attack, and it gives a very
robust performance even with a large probability of attack. We have discussed the
problem of the mismatched measurements, and we have shown that the MLE-QRSS-
GMM is robust in the mismatch situation but it requires the knowledge of attack
probability and attack power.
Thus, another estimator was proposed and it is also based on the Gaussian
mixture assumption. This time we assumed that the probability of the attack and the
power of the attack are both random variables following certain uniform distributions.
Starting from such assumptions we derived the mathematical model and the relevant
distribution for the proposed problem. We derived the MLE-QRSS-RGMM estimator
and its corresponding CRLB. Simulation results showed that the MLE-QRSS-RGMM
estimator provides an excellent and robust performance, without the knowledge of the
attack power and probability.
Next, the problem of Bayesian estimation subjected to false information injection
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attacks is considered. We have formulated the relationship between the attacker and
the defender from a minimax perspective, in which the attacker tries to maximize the
system estimation error by controlling the bias vector, whereas the defender tries to
minimize the system estimation error by optimally selecting the detection threshold.
We assumed two different scenarios. First, we assumed the attacker will attack
with a deterministic bias. For this assumption we have derived the probabilities of
detection and miss detection, based on non-central Chi squared distribution. Sec-
ondly, it is assumed that the attacker will attack with a random bias which follows a
Gaussian distribution with some known prior. For this assumption we have derived
the probabilities of detection and miss detection, by using numerical integration.
The minimax problem was numerically solved for both the cases with the deter-
ministic and random biases. Numerical results showed that if the defender has prior
knowledge of the attacker power, it will be possible to select the optimum detection
threshold that minimizes the worst possible cost function accordingly. On the other
hand, if the defender has no prior knowledge of the attacker’s power, then the best
strategy is to always reject the corrupted sensors’ measurements.
99
REFERENCES
[1] B. Alnajjab and R. S Blum. “After-attack performance of parameter estimation
systems”. In: Proc. 2014 48th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and
Systems (CISS). Princeton, NJ, USA, Mar. 2014, pp. 1–6.
[2] J. Zhang et al. “Asymptotically Optimum Distributed Estimation in the Pres-
ence of Attacks.” In: IEEE Trans. Signal Processing 63.5 (2015), pp. 1086–
1101.
[3] J. Zhang et al. “Functional forms of optimum spoofing attacks for vector pa-
rameter estimation in quantized sensor networks”. In: IEEE Transactions on
Signal Processing 65.3 (2017), pp. 705–720.
[4] J. Lu and R. Niu. “False information injection attack on dynamic state esti-
mation in multi-sensor systems”. In: 17th International Conference on Infor-
mation Fusion (FUSION). IEEE. 2014, pp. 1–8.
[5] J. Zhang, R. S Blum, and H V. Poor. “Approaches to Secure Inference in the
Internet of Things: Performance Bounds, Algorithms, and Effective Attacks
on IoT Sensor Networks”. In: IEEE Signal Processing Magazine 35.5 (2018),
pp. 50–63.
[6] R. Niu and P. K Varshney. “Target location estimation in sensor networks with
quantized data”. In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 54.12 (2006),
pp. 4519–4528.
[7] M. Al-Salman and R. Niu. “Source Location with Quantized Sensor Data Cor-
rupted by False Information”. In: 2018 21st International Conference on In-
formation Fusion (FUSION). IEEE. 2018, pp. 391–397.
100
[8] R. Niu, A. Vempaty, and P. K Varshney. “Received-signal-strength-based local-
ization in wireless sensor networks”. In: Proceedings of the IEEE 106.7 (2018),
pp. 1166–1182.
[9] J. Zhang et al. “Attack detection in sensor network target localization systems
with quantized data”. In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing (2018).
[10] J. H. Lee and R M. Buehrer. “Characterization and detection of location
spoofing attacks”. In: Journal of Communications and Networks 14.4 (2012),
pp. 396–409.
[11] K. Agrawal et al. “Target localization in wireless sensor networks with quan-
tized data in the presence of byzantine attacks”. In: Proc. 2011 Conference
Record of the Forty Fifth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Com-
puters (ASILOMAR). Pacific Grove, CA, USA, Nov. 2011, pp. 1669–1673.
[12] B. Alnajjab, J. Zhang, and R. S Blum. “Attacks on sensor network parameter
estimation with quantization: Performance and asymptotically optimum pro-
cessing”. In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 63.24 (2015), pp. 6659–
6672.
[13] R. Niu and J. Lu. “False information detection with minimum mean squared
errors for Bayesian estimation”. In: 2015 49th Annual Conference on Informa-
tion Sciences and Systems (CISS). IEEE. 2015, pp. 1–6.
[14] J. Zhang and R. S Blum. “Distributed joint spoofing attack identification
and estimation in sensor networks”. In: Proc. 2015 IEEE China Summit and
International Conference on Signal and Information Processing (ChinaSIP).
Chengdu, China, July 2015, pp. 701–705.
101
[15] A. Vempaty, Y. S Han, and P. K Varshney. “Target localization in wireless
sensor networks using error correcting codes in the presence of Byzantines”.
In: Proc. 2013 IEEE Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP). Vancouver, CA, Oct. 2013, pp. 5195–5199.
[16] Z. Li et al. “Robust statistical methods for securing wireless localization in
sensor networks”. In: Proceedings of the 4th international symposium on Infor-
mation processing in sensor networks. IEEE Press. 2005, p. 12.
[17] F. Yin et al. “Cooperative localization in WSNs using Gaussian mixture model-
ing: Distributed ECM algorithms”. In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
63.6 (2015), pp. 1448–1463.
[18] F. Yin et al. “Robust cooperative sensor network localization via the EM cri-
terion in LOS/NLOS environments”. In: 2013 IEEE 14th Workshop on Signal
Processing Advances in Wireless Communications (SPAWC). IEEE. Darm-
stadt, Germany, June 2013, pp. 505–509.
[19] P. Pfaff, C. Plagemann, and W. Burgard. “Gaussian mixture models for proba-
bilistic localization”. In: Proc. 2008. ICRA IEEE International Conference on
Robotics and Automation. IEEE. Pasadena, CA, USA, May 2008, pp. 467–472.
[20] Y. Zhang et al. “Base station localization in search of empty spectrum spaces
in cognitive radio networks”. In: Mobile Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks, 2009.
MSN’09. 5th International Conference on. IEEE. Fujian, China, Dec. 2009,
pp. 94–101.
[21] J. N Ash and R. L Moses. “Outlier compensation in sensor network self-
localization via the EM algorithm”. In: Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Pro-
cessing, 2005. Proceedings.(ICASSP’05). IEEE International Conference on.
Vol. 4. IEEE. Philadelphia, PA, USA, Mar. 2005, pp. 749–752.
102
[22] Y. Zhang et al. “RSS-based localization in WSNs using Gaussian mixture
model via semidefinite relaxation”. In: IEEE Communications Letters 21.6
(2017), pp. 1329–1332.
[23] R. Niu and L. Huie. “System state estimation in the presence of false informa-
tion injection”. In: Statistical Signal Processing Workshop (SSP), 2012 IEEE.
IEEE. 2012, pp. 385–388.
[24] G. Casella and R. L. Berger. Statistical inference. Vol. 2. Duxbury Pacific
Grove, CA, 2002.
[25] Y. Bar-Shalom, X R. Li, and T. Kirubarajan. Estimation with applications to
tracking and navigation: theory algorithms and software. John Wiley & Sons,
2004.
[26] E. Masazade et al. “Energy aware iterative source localization for wireless
sensor networks”. In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 58.9 (2010),
pp. 4824–4835.
[27] H.L. Trees Van, K Bell, Z Tiany, et al. “Detection Estimation and Modulation
Theory”. In: Detection, Estimation, and Filtering Theory. Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2013.
[28] P. Tichavsky, C. H. Muravchik, and A. Nehorai. “Posterior Cramér-Rao bounds
for discrete-time nonlinear filtering”. In: IEEE Transactions on signal process-
ing 46.5 (1998), pp. 1386–1396.
[29] Y. Zheng, R. Niu, and P. K Varshney. “Closed-form performance for loca-
tion estimation based on quantized data in sensor networks”. In: Proc. 2010
13th IEEE Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION). Edinburgh, UK, July
2010, pp. 1–7.
103
[30] X. Sheng and Yu-Hen Hu. “Maximum likelihood multiple-source localization
using acoustic energy measurements with wireless sensor networks”. In: IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing 53.1 (2005), pp. 44–53.
[31] L.E. Kinsler and A.R. Frey. Fundamentals of Acoustics. New York, NY: John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962.
[32] N. Levanon. Radar Principles. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1988.
[33] D. A. Shnidman. “The calculation of the probability of detection and the gen-
eralized Marcum Q-function”. In: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
35.2 (1989), pp. 389–400.
[34] J. G. Proakis and M. Salehi. Digital communications. Vol. 4. McGraw-hill New
York, 2001.
104
